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Representations of Space and Time in the Labyrinth: A Comparative Analysis of City of 
Glass and Biritus madīna taḥta al-arḍ [Biritus a City Underground] 
Serine Jaafar 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines representations of city-labyrinths as they are portrayed in City of 
Glass by Paul Auster and Biritus madīna taḥta al-arḍ [Biritus a City Underground] by 
Rabī’ Jābir. Although an ancient structure, the labyrinth is an intricate space which often 
functions as an ‘other’ reality in the world today; it comes to represent and contain the 
marginal individuals and collectives in society. Slums, ghettos, refugee camps, and 
subway stations are made up of mazy, labyrinthine networks. These intricate spaces are 
difficult to map, for the users of these space often defy the space’s intended function. As 
a space, the labyrinth meets the six principles of heterotopias outlined by Michel 
Foucault in his lecture entitled “Of Other Spaces.”  Thus, the labyrinth can be described 
as a heterotopic space. Such spaces are often characterized by difference and deviation. 
A prison, which Foucault identifies as a heterotopia, is a labyrinth to the guard who is 
unfamiliar with the internal codes and rules known to the prisoners. The labyrinth has a 
distinct spatial and temporal order that is perceived as a disorder by the lost walker. In 
City of Glass, the protagonist uncovers a new order that manifests itself in the form of an 
invented language. As he attempts to interpret this language, he realizes the 
impossibility of escaping this labyrinth. The interpretations yield limitless possibilities 
that are never confirmed. In Biritus, the new order manifests itself through a fictitious 
subterranean city-labyrinth existing beneath modern-day Beirut. Unable to comprehend 
the order of this labyrinth, the protagonist realizes that he must escape the labyrinth or 
remain wedged in the past. Furthermore, the labyrinth challenges the protagonists’ 
notions of time. The temporal order of the labyrinth is characterized by a backwards 
movement in time; the protagonists can only move forward in the labyrinth by moving 
backwards first. The walker discovers that the physical city-labyrinth is only a tangible 
manifestation of the labyrinth within; the journey through the labyrinth is, thus, 
transformed into an internal one. 
Keywords: Labyrinth, Maze, Heterotopia, City, Disorder, Temporal, Spatial      
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Introduction  
 “There is no need to build a labyrinth when the entire universe is one.”  
― Jorge Luis Borges 
The Origin of Labyrinths 
As an architectural structure, the labyrinth is a space with intricate passages in 
which the walker becomes lost. The Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines the 
“labyrinth” as “a place that has many confusing paths or passages; something that is 
extremely complicated or difficult to understand” (“Labyrinth”). Figuratively and 
metaphorically, the term “labyrinth” is used to characterize a difficult or enigmatic 
situation. As Plato describes in the dialogue between Socrates and his friend Crito in 
Euthydemus: 
Then it seemed like falling into a labyrinth; we thought we were at the finish, but 
our way bent round and we found ourselves as it were back at the beginning, and 
just as far from that which we were seeking at first. (404) 
In language, the riddle represents a verbal labyrinth, for riddles are “compact and 
ambiguous statements couched more often than not in structures parallel and 
symmetrical…The fruitless meanings comprise the dead ends and false alleys of the 
verbal labyrinth” (West 79). The mental process of uncovering the answer to the riddle 
resembles the challenging journey through the labyrinth; the lost walker attempts to find 
an exit in the physical labyrinth just as one tries to resolve a riddle, which is itself an 
intangible labyrinth.  
The etymology of the word “labyrinth” remains ambiguous to the present day. In 
1892, German archaeologist Maximilian Mayer claimed that labyrinthos is the house of 
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the double-headed ax (labrys) on Knossos, Crete. Although widely accepted, this 
interpretation has been challenged because the evidence of the existence of a cult of a 
double-headed ax is lacking. In addition, the word labyrs was only the Lydian (and not 
the Greek or Cretan) word for ax. The suffix “-inthos” was used by the Greeks in 
reference to names of places they had come across upon migration (as in Korinthos) 
(Kern 42).    
In his book Through the Labyrinth: Designs and Meanings Over 5,000 Years, 
Hermann Kern argues that the original manifestation of the concept of the labyrinth is 
the dance pattern, for he claims that the dance pattern is the most primordial and direct 
form of expression (25). The graphic and literary forms came at a later stage and were 
attempts to record the movements of the dance. For example, a pitcher from Tragliattella 
(ca. 620 BCE) depicts warriors emerging from a labyrinth in a dance pattern. The word 
“Truia” on the labyrinth translates to “arena” or “dance surface” (Kern 25).  
The lusus Troiae (the Game of Troy), a weapons dance which followed 
labyrinthine paths, was originally enacted on two occasions: during funeral rites and at 
the founding of a city. The purpose of the dance was to establish a protective wall, 
symbolically separating one space from another. The living are protected from the dead, 
and the interior space of the city is protected from the external world beyond its walls 
(Kern 80). When perceived as such, the labyrinth also functions as a form of protection 
against outsiders. Virgil describes Anchises’s funeral games in the fifth book of the 
Aeneid. Aeneas calls upon his son Ascanius who has created a dance pattern to be 
performed by his fellows on horseback to honor Anchises: 
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Next they start on other charges and other retreats in corresponsive spaces, and 
interlink circle with circle, and wage the armed phantom of battle. And now they 
bare their backs in flight, now turn their lances to the charge, now plight peace 
and ride on side by side. As once of old, they say, the labyrinth in high Crete had 
a tangled path between blind walls, and a thousand ways of doubling treachery, 
where tokens to follow failed in the maze unmastered and irrecoverable: even in 
such a track do the children of Troy entangle their footsteps and weave the game 
of flight and battle. (110) 
The Game of Troy and the structure of a labyrinth are similar in that they are both 
“complex in pattern, difficult to follow, and interwoven” (Doob 28). Hence to those 
inside the labyrinth (the dancers performing the complex dance), the paths are 
decipherable. However, to the outsider, the dance is characterized by winding and 
perplexing paths.  
Labyrinths in varied forms have also been depicted on Christian church floors 
since late antiquity. Their function remains disputed as the evidence to explain their 
existence is inconclusive. One theory states that they served as symbolic paths of 
repentance (Kern 146). Another interpretation suggests that the feeble and sick who 
were unable to visit Jerusalem performed pilgrimages on their feet or knees in church 
labyrinths (Doob 119). This function of church labyrinths, however, likely emerged in 
the eighteenth century. 
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Labyrinths and Mazes 
The terms “labyrinth” and “maze” are used interchangeably today; however, 
certain scholars distinguish between the two structures. William Henry Matthews argues 
that the terms “labyrinth” and “maze” can be used interchangeably (2). Other scholars 
differentiate between the physical and architectural structures of the labyrinth and the 
maze (Kern 23; Doob 50). They argue that the structure of the labyrinth has only one 
path which leads to the center. The center is a dead end; thus, the walker must walk back 
the same path he entered in order to exit the labyrinth. In contrast to the labyrinth, the 
structure of a maze requires the walker to choose paths, creating more possibilities for 
the walker. This distinction between mazes and labyrinths is important when one traces 
the architectural and historical evolution of such spaces. It also remains significant when 
one considers the implications of the single-path labyrinth and the multicursural maze. 
To become physically lost within the paths of the labyrinth or the maze does not only 
bring about an external sense of disorientation but an internal one as well. It may appear 
that the journey through the single-path labyrinth poses no challenge to the walker; after 
all, the walker merely follows the single path which leads to the center and walks back 
out of the labyrinth through the same path. What must not be overlooked, however, is 
the internal, psychological journey. The uncertainty of where the path will lead and of 
when the journey will end leaves the walker feeling detached and disoriented. In the 
labyrinth, there is no assurance, as even what lies in the center is unknown to the walker; 
the center (if there is one) is ambiguous, and the walker discovers its meaning only upon 
reaching it. The walker has little control over the surrounding space, for even though one 
knows where the labyrinth begins, one is never certain of where it will end. Likewise, 
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the maze too leaves the wanderer feeling helpless within its spaces; the walker 
continuously questions whether the choices made are the right ones. Thus, the labyrinth 
does not only pose an external, physical challenge (to find one’s way out of the tortuous 
paths) but becomes an internal journey. The center, then, is a turning point for the 
walker. As Kern describes: 
Once at the center, our subject is all alone, encountering him-or herself a divine 
principle, a Minotaur, or anything else for which the ‘center’ might 
stand...Therefore, turning around at the center does not just mean giving up one’s 
previous existence; it also marks new beginnings. A walker leaving the labyrinth 
is not the same person who entered it, but has been born again into a new phase 
or level of existence; the center is where death and rebirth occur. (30) 
While the labyrinth presents the walker with an internal challenge that can be overcome 
by a process of self-reflection, the maze forces the walker to focus on the external 
surroundings in order to make choices that will lead to an exit. The distinction between 
labyrinths and mazes is important when one considers its implications; one journey is an 
internal challenge, another is an external one. Today, however, the terms “labyrinth” and 
“maze” are used interchangeably, and the boundaries between the external and internal 
journeys through the labyrinth have been blurred. As such, the notion of the labyrinth is 
one that includes the idea of the maze and vice versa. Thus, in today’s world, the 
distinction between the maze and the labyrinth dissolves
1
.    
                                                          
1
 For the purposes of this thesis, the terms “labyrinth” and “maze” will be used interchangeably.  
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The Labyrinth of Daedalus 
The Egyptian labyrinth near Hawara is one of the earliest labyrinths. This 
structure was a temple erected by the Twelfth Dynasty’s greatest pharaoh, Amenemhet 
III (19
th
 c. B.C.) (Kern 57; MacGillivray 329-330). Admired by the Greeks, it served as 
a model for the Cretan labyrinth. Today, only a few columns remain of this grand 
structure. What is known about it primarily comes from ancient accounts. In the second 
book of his Histories, the Greek historian Herodotus describes:  
Certainly, there can be no doubting that the Labyrinth would have cost more in 
terms of sweat and gold than all the walls and public monuments built by the 
Greeks put together…Take the corridors which lead from vestibule to vestibule, 
for instance, or the passages which twist with such intricacy between the various 
courtyards: these, as we wound our way from a courtyard to some chambers, and 
then from the chambers to a colonnade, and on from the colonnade into some 
vestibules, and then from the vestibules back out into a courtyard, provided a 
source of limitless wonderment to me. (172) 
Another well-known early architectural labyrinth is the Minoan Palace at Knossos, 
which is also known as the Palace of the Double Ax. Some believe that the labyrinth 
built for King Minos was a replica of the Egyptian labyrinth. This palace is often 
associated with the Cretan myth of Theseus and the Minotaur. Daedalus built the 
labyrinth for King Minos of Crete to detain the half-man, half-bull Minotaur who was 
born to Pasiphaë, queen of Crete. The Minotaur was born out of Pasiphaë’s love affair 
with the Cretan bull that was given to Minos in answer to his prayers to become king. 
When Minos refused to sacrifice the bull as a show of his appreciation, Aphrodite cursed 
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Pasiphaë with an infatuation for the beautiful white bull. The Minotaur (man and beast) 
was born out of this love affair. To control, contain, and conceal the Minotaur, Daedalus 
was instructed by Minos to build the labyrinth. In the eighth book of his 
Metamorphoses, Ovid states, “Minos intended/ To remove this shame from his chambers 
and enclose it/ In a dark, winding labyrinth. Daedalus,/ A renowned master architect, did 
the work,/ Confounding the usual lines of sight/With a maze of conflicting 
passageways” (210).  
Daedalus’s labyrinth is a structure which represents man’s ability to impose 
order on a reality governed by chaos. Unable to recognize the Minotaur as part of his 
reality, Minos attempts to construct a secluded space for the Minotaur. The construction 
of the labyrinth is, thus, an attempt to restore order to Minos’s world. For this to occur, 
the Minotaur must be concealed from Minos’s reality. However, in producing a space in 
which the Minotaur can exist, Minos also produces another reality which, paradoxically, 
becomes difficult to control and navigate. Even the labyrinth’s architect himself is barely 
able to escape this intricate structure. In some accounts, he does not escape at all.  
So complicated was the labyrinth that no individual was ever able to escape its 
paths. Every year, Minos commanded that seven men and women be sent from Athens 
to be fed to the Minotaur to avenge the death of his son, Androgeus, who was killed in 
the Panathenaic Games in Athens. Theseus, son of Aegeus, decides to slay the Minotaur; 
he is sent to Crete as one of the seven young men. Theseus eventually slays the Minotaur 
and escapes the labyrinth with the help of Minos’s daughter, Princess Ariadne, who falls 
in love with him. Thus, Theseus is successful on his journey as a result of Ariadne’s 
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clew. She gives Theseus the Mitos (the skein of thread) to help him navigate his way 
back out of the labyrinth. The clew becomes a significant metaphor as it is: 
the life-line spun and rolled into a ball by the Fates at birth and unravelled 
throughout one's life, making it a guide through life's perplexities. The key is to 
find one's clew and to learn how to follow it; otherwise one is lost in the maze. 
(MacGillivray 229) 
Theseus’s encounter with the Minotaur represents the center of labyrinth, for he 
discovers his true path and purpose at that moment.  
Yet, not everyone is as fortunate as Theseus. He is saved by Ariadne’s clew; 
however, what happens when one does not find the Mitos? When in possession of the 
clew, one does not fear the consequences of each choice. Without it, navigating the 
labyrinth “may require either the most astute intellect, actively noting each turn and 
remembering each passage, or it may require complete unthinking acquiescence, a Zen-
like blending of the self into the maze until it is fully internalized within the wanderer” 
(Hawthorne 78). The discovery at the center (if there is one) may bring about self-
awareness or it may uncover evils of the world which are best left there. In either case, 
the walker returns from the journey a changed individual. 
The labyrinth may appear to be a chaotic, aimless space, but it only appears so to 
the outsider who is unable to decipher its paths. To the insider who has found a way to 
‘map’ this space, the labyrinth has a clear structure and form: 
Its architecture may be so complex that it defies analysis and thus appears 
aimless, but to the insider, the architect or whoever knows the plan, a labyrinth is 
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never formless. To the outsider or the person trapped in it, it may seem as 
formless as a garbage dump, the canals of Venice, or the crisscrossing of forest 
paths; escape from it may seem impossible or, if finally possible, very difficult, 
achieved only by a few initiates. (Hawthorne 78) 
A bird’s-eye view of the labyrinth allows one to observe the visible order of this 
structure.  From above, it is fixed and static; from within, it is a dynamic space that is 
continuously altered by the walkers’ choices.     
Representations of Labyrinths in City of Glass and Biritus madīna taḥta 
al-arḍ 
The significance of the labyrinth in the Cretan myth is very much illustrative of 
the function of the modern labyrinth in literature today. At its most basic level, the 
labyrinth functions to disorient and delude the walker. In today’s world, the modern city-
labyrinth operates in this manner with its web-like paths, complex networks, and 
intricate relationships. The protagonist today may embody some or all the qualities of 
the characters of the Cretan myth. Like Minos, he can be a creator of this space, like the 
Minoatur, he can become a prisoner of it, or like Theseus, he can overcome the 
challenge and leave the labyrinth as a changed individual. Minos commands the 
construction of the labyrinth in order to contain the Minotaur. The labyrinth, thus, 
becomes a tool to control reality—an attempt to impose order on a disordered world. 
Minos, however, fails to see that in giving the Minotaur a space, he also gives him the 
potential to create an alternative time-space which, paradoxically, becomes 
uncontrollable. In giving him a time-space, he is affirming his existence (and not erasing 
it as he had initially planned to do). Like the Minotaur who roams the labyrinth in search 
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of an exit, the protagonist treads the paths of the city-labyrinth in search of meaning. For 
the modern Minotaur, the labyrinth may function as a refuge. Enveloped within its walls, 
the protagonist constructs and exists in a labyrinth of his own creation. It can act as a 
refuge from the harshness of this world; one may choose to dwell in the labyrinth 
because it remains safer than the external world in spite of its perceived chaos. The 
protagonist can also be a modern Theseus, roaming the labyrinth with the purpose of 
slaying the Minotaur. Unlike Theseus, however, the modern protagonist often discovers 
that there is no Minotaur to confront or worse, that the Minotaur lurks within. The 
protagonist today, lacking Theseus’s valor and purpose, finds himself in the labyrinth by 
chance and not by choice. Immersed in the labyrinth, the protagonist is unable to 
perceive the space in its entirety, and he has no choice but to wander. It appears that the 
labyrinth, although an ancient structure, continues to symbolize the condition of modern 
man today; “The labyrinth is a clever metaphor for life. Whoever goes into that maze 
must find their way through the complexity of twists and turns to defeat the monster 
lurking there” (Mac Gillivray 329). What the protagonists discover is that the monsters 
prowl within, transforming the journey through the labyrinth into an internal one; the 
physical journey is merely a tangible representation of the internal labyrinth inside each 
one of us. To escape this labyrinth, one must find a way to slay the Minotaur within. 
This thesis examines representations of city-labyrinths as they are portrayed in 
City of Glass by Paul Auster and Biritus madīna taḥta al-arḍ by Rabī’ Jābir. The 
labyrinth is an intricate space which often functions as an ‘other’ reality in the world 
today; consequently, it comes to represent and house the marginal individuals and 
collectives in society. As a space, it meets the six principles of heterotopias outlined by 
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Michel Foucault in his lecture entitled “Of Other Spaces,” thus it can be described as a 
heterotopic space. Such spaces are often characterized by difference, deviation, and 
marginality. A prison, which Foucault identifies as a heterotopia, can also be a labyrinth 
to the guard who is unfamiliar with the internal codes and rules known to the prisoners. 
Furthermore, labyrinths follow a temporal and spatial order which is different from the 
external space they are a part of. This order is perceived as a disorder by the lost walker. 
Through imposing a certain order, this space also imposes a distinct time pattern, 
challenging the walker’s own notions of time.    
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Chapter One 
Understanding Space and Heterotopias: Manifestations 
of Real-life Labyrinths 
For the purposes of understanding labyrinths as spaces, it becomes significant to 
understand and define the term “space” as well as to explore the implications of the 
concept of “space”. To conceive of space as a product of historical, social, and spatial 
forces implies that all spaces are in a continuous state of ‘becoming’. Spaces are utilized, 
occupied, (mis)used, abused, owned, sold, forgotten, created, and destroyed. Every 
society produces its own space; the space of the ancient world cannot merely be 
understood as a group of people and things that once existed in a given space nor can 
they be understood only through the texts of Plato and Artistotle (Lefebvre 31). As the 
French philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre maintains, “(Social) space is not a 
thing among things, nor a product among other products; rather, it subsumes things 
produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and 
simultaneity—their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder” (Lefebvre 73). This 
conception of space goes beyond the physical understanding of space, and it 
encompasses space in its social, cultural, and historical dimensions. Space, thus, comes 
to be seen as a dynamic entity.  
In the past, space had often been considered a fixed entity whereas history 
implied progress and fecundity. The fascination of the 19
th
 century was history, “with its 
themes of development and of suspension, of crisis and cycle, themes of the ever-
accumulating past, with its great preponderance of dead men and the menacing 
glaciation of the world” (Foucault 22). This period saw the overprivileging of history 
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(time) over spatial thought. In their introduction to Thinking Space, Mike Crang and 
Nigel J. Thrift assert that “part of the reason for the turn to space in many disciplines has 
been a drive to move away from the tyrannies of historicism and developmentalism,[yet] 
the fact remains that space without time is as improbable as time without space” (1). 
Thus, they add that Michel Foucault’s “celebrated announcement that the era of space 
was succeeding that of time needs to be taken with a pinch of salt” (1). Consequently, 
the priority given to historical forces had quieted the power of spatial thought (Soja 15).     
Prior to the 1960s, human geography was primarily concerned with describing 
the differences between various geographical locations throughout the world. This 
‘regional geography’ addressed questions such as: “Why was the South of the United 
States different from the North?” and “How many regions could be identified in 
England?” (Creswell 16). It began with a description of the physical and geographical 
features of a space and ended with an analysis of the ‘culture’ being studied; thus, a 
description of how regions differed resulted in the creation of boundaries (Creswell 16). 
Space and place were understood as locations, and they appealed to: 
the nomothetic or generalizing impulse of science…Since the particular had no 
place in the hierarchy of values developed in the post-enlightenment world, 
studies of place were often relegated to ‘mere description’ while space was given 
the role of developing scientific law-like generalizations. In order to make this 
work, people had to be removed from the scene. This empty space could then be 
used to develop a kind of spatial mathematics—a geometry. (Creswell 16)        
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The 1980s saw a shift in spatial theory as it relates to power, gender, class, race, and the 
social and cultural world (Creswell 29). For example, Kay Anderson studied the 
development of Chinatown in Vancouver, Canada. She argues that “these places cannot 
simply be read as symbols of essential Chineseness but rather that such places are 
ideologically constructed as places of difference” and are “the result of negotiation with 
those with power to define place”  (qtd. in Creswell 28). 
The notion that space is continuously (re)produced through the interaction of the 
physical, social, historical, political, and cultural forces is difficult to grasp as a result of 
what Lefebvre identifies as the double illusion of space: the illusion of transparency and 
the realistic illusion (28). The illusion of transparency deceives one into believing that 
space is innocent. Space “appears as luminous, as intelligible, as giving action free rein” 
(Lefebvre 29). The realistic illusion leads one to believe that space is simply ‘out there’; 
it is merely the physical entity in which our lives are carried out (Lefebvre 29). The 
implications of these illusions are twofold. Firstly, space is no longer only seen as a 
passive backdrop but as fluid and dynamic entity which is ‘produced’ by people, society, 
and history. Secondly, space becomes a force, for it is not only a consequence of social 
actions but (oftentimes) also an initiator of them.  
Lefebvre’s conception of space is based on a triad of interconnected spatial 
dimensions: spatial practice (the perceived space), representational spaces (the lived 
space), and representations of space (the conceived space). Spatial practice: 
embodies…a close association…between daily reality (daily routine) and urban 
reality (the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, 
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‘private’ life and leisure)...A spatial practice must have certain cohesiveness but 
this does not imply that this is coherent. (Lefevbre 38) 
A space comprises a set of places that are interconnected through physical urban 
networks (roads, railways, airports, harbors, pedestrians’ paths, the internet, and the 
media) which are utilized by inhabitants as they move from one place to another by 
using common networks. Thus, the spatial practice is constructed through the walker’s 
choices; a walker chooses paths over others depending on his priorities. For instance, 
one can take a longer yet more pleasant route home as opposed to a shorter but noisy 
path. It is worth noting that Lefevre’s concept of spatial practice does not take into 
consideration modern developments in communication routes such as the internet and 
the media, which brought the speed and possibility of communication between distinct 
places to a level that is unprecedented in human history.  
Representational space (the lived space) is the space “as directly lived through its 
associated images and symbols, and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’” 
(Lefebvre 39) It is thus “the dominated—and hence passively experienced—space which 
the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. It overlays physical space, making 
symbolic use of its objects” (Lefebvre 39). This space is complex, symbolic, and 
abstract; it is relevant to culture, history, and ideology. Unlike spatial practice, 
representational space is not necessarily characterized by cohesion or consistency. It is 
the space as it is lived and experienced thus is laden with symbols that have personal as 
well as collective meaning. Representational space is connected to spatial practice, for it 
is about how individuals ‘use’ space. Yet, it is also about how people give meaning to 
places within that space. For instance, a public park may have sentimental value to the 
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residents in the neighborhood. Perhaps it holds memories which tie generations together. 
It is in this space that meaning is produced and that history is (re)created and interpreted. 
Representations of space (the conceived spaces) are the spaces “of scientists, 
planners, urbanists…all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what 
is conceived” (Lefebvre 38). Using their understanding of spatial practice and 
representational space, they seek to construct and modify the space through plans, maps, 
models, and designs for building roads, parks, hospitals, educational institutions, 
museums, theaters, and vehicles for transportation. For instance, a suburban 
neighborhood is constructed to accommodate a quiet, secure family-oriented lifestyle. It 
will likely include a common outdoor public space in which children can safely roam. 
Thus, the area was constructed by planners and architects to suit such needs; this 
corresponds to the representations of space.  
All spaces are produced by the interrelations between the elements of Lefebvre’s 
triad: spatial practice, representational space, and representations of space. Each of the 
three facets of space identified by Lefebvre allows us to conceive of space as an active 
and dynamic force. What is significant about Lefebvre’s triad is the notion that spatial 
practices and representational spaces often defy the representations of space. Because 
they have the ability to contradict “conceived” spaces and alter “perceived” spaces, 
representational spaces (“lived” spaces) have the potential to become spaces of 
resistance. Students climbing over the school wall in order to leave the school premises 
do not see the wall as an isolating barrier but as a possibility to achieve a means to an 
end (escaping the humdrum of the school hours); the wall ceases to function as it was 
once conceived. A walker of the city produces this representational space, for he: 
17 
 
transforms each spatial signifier into something else. And if on the one he 
actualizes only a few of the possibilities fixed by the constructed order (he goes 
only here and not there), on the other he increases the number of possibilities (for 
example, by creating shortcuts and detours) and prohibitions (for example, he 
forbids himself to take paths generally considered accessible or even obligatory). 
(Ceratu 98) 
Thus, the maps designed by the planners of a space become unnecessary; 
“[a]lthough maps purport to accurately represent places, they actually produce 
ideological spaces, and in so doing ignore human experiences of spaces” (Middleton and 
Woods 282). Maps, then, have much to do with conceived spaces, for they explain how 
a space ought to be ‘used’. Human experiences, on the other hand, are about spatial 
practices and representational spaces which are related to how inhabitants actually ‘use’ 
their space. A walker can choose to disregard the map and construct his own trajectories. 
Individuals construct their own maps and produce their own (dis)order. They become 
active agents in the manner by which they construct and produce their space. 
Lefebvre’s facets of space are also important when considering the complex 
space of the labyrinth. As a representation of space (conceived space), the labyrinth was 
designed by Daedalus under Minos’s command to ensure that the Minotaur remains 
forever lost in its paths. It was constructed to delude the Minotaur and any other walker 
who roams inside. However, the spatial practice and representational space of the 
intricate structure of the labyrinth comes alive with the Minotaur and the lost walkers’ 
activity. The space takes a new meaning as the lost walkers attempting to flee the 
labyrinth have to overcome two challenges: deciphering the physical paths of the 
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labyrinths and escaping the deadly Minotaur. Although labyrinths as conceived spaces 
are intended to disorient the walker, the walker actively makes choices about which 
paths to take; at the forking path of a labyrinth, he must choose one path over the other. 
Upon reaching a dead end, he must walk back to make an entirely different choice. He 
may create physical markers (for example, a mark on the wall) to help him navigate his 
path or use existing ones. Because they are about the walker’s choices and are concerned 
with the walker’s usage of space, they are connected to spatial practices and 
representational spaces.  
1.1 Manifestations of Labyrinths 
While the city represents a space which can be mapped, there remain unknown, 
concealed ‘unmappable’ spaces within the city. Often labyrinthine-like and secluded, 
these spaces follow their own order. Such spaces are not isolated from the city; rather, 
they come about as a reflection and by-product of it. The most noticeable city-labyrinths 
in city spaces exist beneath the ground. David Pike describes the social and cultural 
development of the underground with respect to its geographical development. These 
developments can be understood in certain contexts (in this case, the contexts of London 
and Paris). The sewers, then, are one way in which the labyrinth manifests itself in the 
city. On the one hand, the sewer carries the waste produced by the inhabitants away 
from the city; hence, it is a form of control in the modern city. On the other hand, the 
sewer is an “irrational space, the most organic, primitive, and uncontrollable part of the 
modern city” (Subterranean Cities 191). Pike states that the sewers do not only 
accumulate the waste of human excrement but also the “cast-off and outmoded remains 
of things, places, techniques, and ideas for which the physical and conceptual space no 
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longer exists in the world above” (Subterranean Cities 191). Hence, the sewers, with 
their underground labyrinthine paths, become a metaphor for the marginalized; it is there 
that they are allowed to create an alternative reality which remains connected to the 
world above.  
Another underground labyrinth is that of the underground railway.  Pike 
describes the Paris Métro: 
Its tunnels, stations, and trains are dominated by the mechanisms of the state: the 
planned, abstract conceptual framework of trains and tunnels, conductors, ticket 
sellers, and maintenance crews as well as the security system of transit police 
and surveillance equipment. Overlapping and interacting with this conceived 
space are the rhythms of the commuting that constitute everyday life in the 
modern city and the unforeseen, underground rhythms of that city, from 
clochards, panhandlers, and subway musicians to pickpockets and muggers to 
systemic breakdowns and malfunctions to the overlapping personal and social 
histories imbricated throughout the system. (Metropolis on the Styx 13) 
Those who use this space are not merely restricted to following the path of the 
map (the conceived space). For instance, the subway musicians are juxtaposed with the 
commuters who merely want to arrive at a destination. This labyrinth becomes a 
dynamic living space which follows its own internal rules. At night, this space becomes 
the space of the homeless and the vagabonds; it comes alive once again with their 
movements. Although the city-labyrinth may appear to be fragmented and disordered 
from the outside,“[n]either cities nor places in them are unordered, unplanned; the 
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question is only whose order, whose planning, for what purpose, in whose interest” 
(Marcuse 224). This space has learnt to regulate itself and impose its own order on the 
city. What must not be overlooked is the role of the social, cultural, and political forces 
which produce (or prevent) the actualization of any given space. To speak of the 
contemporary underground railway of Dubai conjures in the mind an image wholly 
different from the underground railway of Paris. Contrary to Parisian underground 
railway, the marginalized (for example, the musicians seeking to make a living) are not 
allowed nor given the permission to tempoarlize in the underground railway of Dubai 
where authority controls and sets clear boundaries which cannot be crossed.  
Above the ground, labyrinths manifest themselves in diverse forms, some 
transient and short-lived while others permanent and everlasting. From seemingly 
chaotic street festivals and fairs to seemingly ordered prisons and refugee camps, the 
labyrinth has become the structure which best illustrates the condition of spaces in many 
of today’s cities. Labyrinths are also produced from the movements of the pedestrians 
and walkers of the city whose “swarming mass is an innumerable collection of 
singularities” (Certeau 97). This labyrinth is one that is in constant flux; it is 
continuously (re)produced by the movements of the walkers in the city. When seen from 
above, this labyrinth dissolves; “An Icarus flying above these waters, he [the viewer 
from above] can ignore the devices of Daedalus in mobile and endless labyrinths far 
below” (Certeau 92). The city from above is the theoretical “panorama-city”; it 
corresponds to the representations of space, for it is the space of the “space planner 
urbanist, city planner or cartographer” (Certeau 93). In the labyrinth below, the walkers 
continuously alter the representational space. Their trajectories can be identified on a 
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map, but their movements “refer, like words, to the absence of what has passed by” 
(Certeau 97). Each step creates endless possibilities, and each choice brings something 
new. Even upon reaching a dead end, the walkers’ choices are limitless, for they have to 
walk back the same path to make alternative choices. Although this labyrinth has no 
physical walls, its walls are created and transformed every day by the movements of 
walkers; “They walk—an elementary form of this experience of the city…[their] bodies 
follow the thicks and thins of urban ‘text’ they write without being able to read it” 
(Certeau 93).  When the walkers disappear, this labyrinth, too, fades. Because this space 
does not have boundaries, it becomes difficult to ‘control’. It creates a twofold threat; 
the fear of becoming lost and going astray and the fear that moving crowds can turn 
mob-like. Related to this is the notion that ‘sameness’ creates a labyrinth. One 
characteristic of labyrinths is the mirroring effect that is produced as a result of the 
walker’s inability to recall whether he has crossed a certain path before or not. When 
everything appears the same, reference points disappear and the walker becomes 
disoriented. This is illustrated through the experience of being a tourist without a map.   
More significant than external labyrinths is the labyrinth within; this is a 
labyrinth with invisible walls. It is perhaps the condition of all human beings—the 
despair and frustration which arises as a consequence of a fruitless search for meaning in 
senseless world. We roam inside labyrinths of memory and history. At times, we 
intentionally construct our labyrinths, for the world outside becomes excruciatingly 
intolerable. In this case, the labyrinth functions as a refuge. Very often, internal 
labyrinths manifest themselves through psychological illnesses such as multiple 
personality disorder or schizophrenia.  
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A key figure who has written about the concept-space of the labyrinth is 
Argentinean short-story writer and essayist Jorge Luis Borges. In his “Notes on Borges’ 
Labyrinth,” Frank Dauster writes of Borges’ short stories. Upon analyzing the function 
of labyrinths in Borges’ stories, he concludes that they reveal insights: 
of a chaotic universe, formless and without natural laws, within which man 
wanders in search of his destiny. In this search, man imposes intellectual 
constructions designed to aid him in the search by ordering reality. But upon 
penetrating to the center of his own creation, man realizes the falsity of this 
construction, penetrates the meaning of existence, and is left with no recourse but 
to die, resigned to the implacable fact of the universe: its total pointlessness. 
(148) 
The experience of being in labyrinth changes the walker, for the walker is “born 
again into a new phase or level of existence” (Kern 30); this new phase of existence may 
be one of rebirth (the walker returns to the external world as a changed individual with 
new perspectives) or of destruction (the walker is never entirely able to cope with the 
external world). The labyrinth forces the walker to not only search the external paths for 
an exit, but also to look within for answers. As a result, being in the labyrinth becomes 
an internal as well as an external journey.  
1.2 Labyrinths as Heterotopias 
 Sigurd Lax states that the medical term heterotopia is used to “indicate a spatial 
displacement of normal tissue” which does not affect the overall functioning of the 
organism (qtd. in Sohn 41). Literally meaning other (heteros) place (topos), Foucault 
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borrowed this medical term in the preface of his book The Order of Things, where he 
describes heterotopias as: 
disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they 
make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common 
names, because they destroy ‘syntax’, and not only the syntax with which we 
construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and 
things (next to and also opposite one another) to ‘hold together’. (xviii)  
He later uses the term in his lecture “Of Other Spaces” to denote places which are 
different from the everyday quotidian spaces. His usage, thus, shifts to describe 
heterotopias in spatial terms. It is a vast concept which encompasses places such as 
boarding schools, cemeteries, libraries, theaters, and festivals.  
Foucault’s description of heterotopias manifests itself in two forms|: heterotopias 
as textual spaces and heterotopias as physical spaces (Topinka 58). The two forms which 
heterotopias take are an attack/resistance of a dominant social order (Topinka 58). As 
spaces, heterotopias can sometimes function as ‘other’ spaces reserved for the 
marginalized figures and groups in society. As “textual” spaces, heterotopias entail an 
“attack on the principles according to which texts are written: grammar, syntax, and 
more generally, order” (Topinka 58).  
Foucault’s concept of heterotopias becomes important when one considers the 
implications of heterotopic sites. Labyrinths, like heterotopias, are spaces which allow 
alternative realities to exist, thus they become sites of creation. For instance, the 
labyrinth (and heterotopia) of the short-lived festival produces alternative realities which 
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would not be allowed to unfurl in everyday spaces; the everyday space is temporarily 
replaced with an-other world. Because labyrinths often evolve on the margins, they 
come to resemble heterotopias, places that are “outside of all places, even though it may 
be possible to indicate their location in reality” (Foucault 24). Certain heterotopic spaces 
that exist on the margins share features with labyrinths. To exist in a labyrinth (whether 
by choice or by force) is to exist (temporarily or eternally, partially or entirely) outside 
the dominant order. Labyrinths are spaces which tend to be ignored and disregarded due 
to their default nature; they are enclosed spaces with a limited number of entrances and 
exits, they pose the threat of disorientation, and they follow a distinct order which often 
clashes with the outside world.  
Thus, heterotopias, which may function as spaces of deviation and difference, 
must undoubtedly extend to labyrinths. That is not to say that all heterotopias are 
labyrinths, but in one sense, all labyrinths are heterotopias, for they satisfy the principles 
of heterotopias outlined by Foucault. One main characteristic that distinguishes the 
labyrinth from other spaces is the extensive complexity of its paths which ensures that a 
walker becomes lost and disoriented.  
Foucault’s conception of spatial heterotopias is primarily based on six principles 
he outlines in “Of Other Spaces,” a lecture which was never intended for publication. He 
describes heterotopias as “real places—places that do exist and that are formed in the 
very founding of society—which are something like counter-sites…” (24). In contrast to 
utopias which are spaces in their utmost perfected (yet never attainable) form, 
heterotopias are the “real sites” that exist within every culture. To illustrate this 
distinction, Foucault uses the example of a mirror. The mirror is both a utopia and a 
25 
 
heterotopia; the reflection represents a virtual “placeless place”. However, it also 
functions as a heterotopia, for in looking at the mirror, one realizes that the space he/she 
occupies is “absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds” (Foucault 24). 
The reflection, then, represents an alternative view of oneself (Topinka 61). It may 
reveal features one was previously unaware of; one cannot ‘un-see’ his reflection. Thus, 
as Foucault claims in The Order of Things, heterotopias threaten the ground on which 
one stands by challenging the norms of the dominant order. Similarly, the journey 
through the labyrinth leaves the walker a changed individual; it may cause him to 
discover and face internal conflicts and struggles, eternally changing the walker and 
challenging his notions of selfhood.    
The first principle is that heterotopias exist in every culture. Although they are 
universal, they are diverse and may vary in the manner in which they temporalize in the 
world. Foucault categorizes heterotopias into two types: heterotopias of crisis and 
heterotopias of deviation. Heterotopias of crisis exist in pre-modern societies and refer to 
places reserved for people who are temporarily in a state of crisis in relation to their 
society (adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women). For example, the 
nineteenth century boarding school or military service for young adolescent men 
functions as heterotopias. In this space, the young adolescents in a state of ‘crisis’ 
encountered “the first manifestations of sexual virility” which “were in fact supposed to 
take place ‘elsewhere’ than at home” (Foucault 24). In modern society, these 
heterotopias of crisis are being replaced by heterotopias of deviation—spaces reserved 
for individuals whose behavior deviates from the norm (prisons, rest homes, psychiatric 
institutions) (Foucault 25). Today, one important aspect to reconsider concerning 
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heterotopias of deviation is that the “social norms from which deviance emerges (that 
deviance mirrors) have become more flexible, and deviance a more transient concept” 
(Cenzatti 77). As a result of diversity, deviance has become a characteristic of the city; 
the term “deviance” is no longer only reserved for outlaws and the mentally ill. 
Consequently, a new layer of space (and meaning) has been added to heterotopias: 
heterotopias of difference (Cenzatti 79). Heterotopias of deviation continue to exist in 
today’s cities and remain spaces that are reserved for individuals who do not fit within 
the mold of the norm. One example of such a space existing in the metropolis is that of 
the prison. Inside the prison, there are internal rules known only by the prisoners 
themselves. The ‘deviant’ groups “re-code these other spaces with their own informal 
and often invisible meanings, rules and times” (Cenzatti 79).  Yet, unlike heterotopias of 
deviation which are expected and required to remain isolated from the everyday actions 
of the city, heterotopias of difference: 
fluctuate between contradiction and acceptance, their physical expression equally 
fluctuates between invisibility and recognition. No longer the monumental 
constructions of heterotopias of deviance, the ‘other spaces’ of difference are 
part of everyday life, in part invisible (such as a coffee shop or a bar where a 
particular social group meets), in part in full sight (for example, when a park in 
Milan or a bridge between skyscrapers in Honk Kong is occupied by Filipino 
maids on their free day), and often in the in-between penumbra (such as the 
parking lots in Los Angeles where day labourers wait to be hired). (Cenzatti79)  
Similarly, in his introduction to The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de 
Certeau states that “[m]araginality is today no longer limited to minority groups , but is 
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rather massive and pervasive…[It] is becoming universal” (xvii). Such a conception of 
heterotopias is more fitting to today’s modern city where deviance is no longer reserved 
for those on the outskirts but has rather become a condition of the city. The shape of the 
labyrinth, too, can be said to represent the condition of any city; the city-labyrinth is a 
complex networks of interrelated physical as well intangible relationships. Although the 
city can be deciphered through the map, the walker can choose to ignore the map. By 
defying the map, the walker adds a new layer of (dis)order to the city, further 
complicating this labyrinthine space.   
The second principle of heterotopias states that the nature of heterotopias 
changes across time. For example, until the eighteenth century in western culture, 
cemeteries were placed next to churches; however, in the early nineteenth century, 
cemeteries were no longer in the center but on the outskirts of cities. “The dead…bring 
illnesses to the living, and it is the presence and proximity of the dead right beside the 
houses, next to the church, almost in the middle of the street, it is this proximity that 
propagates death itself” (Foucault 25). This shift in location indicates a shift in function; 
cemeteries were no longer the heart of cities but rather “the other city, where each 
family possesses its dark resting place” (Foucault 25). This is true for labyrinths which 
may function in one way over a certain time period and in another in a different time 
period. The labyrinth of Burj Ḥamūd which exists on the suburbs of North-East Beirut 
began as a refugee camp established by Armenians who had escaped the Armenian 
Genocide in 1915; survivors were allowed to build shacks in the then marshy region. 
Today, the space has ascertained its permanence in the city; residential buildings, 
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schools, restaurants, businesses, banks, markets, and bustling crowds have replaced the 
shacks.   
The third principle states that heterotopias can juxtapose in a given space 
numerous sites that are in themselves incompatible. The space of the theater (the 
rectangular room) is juxtaposed with the spaces (scenes) created on stage, for the theater 
“brings onto the rectangle of the stage, one after the other, whole series of places that are 
foreign to one another” (Foucault 25). Similarly, the labyrinth brings together realities 
that would not usually coexist. For instance, in the labyrinth underground metro, 
beggars, musicians, and artists who use this space to survive are juxtaposed with 
travelers and employees who use this space as a passage to a destination. As a result of 
the juxtaposition of various ‘real’ spaces within a single site, heterotopias bring various 
individuals, social groups, and social relations in contact with another. It, then, also 
becomes a “space of conflict and confrontation where Lefebvre’s three facets of space 
visibly come together and where Foucault’s ‘juxtaposition of incompatible spaces’ 
occurs” (Cenzatti 83).  
The fourth principle asserts that heterotopias have an internal clock which 
functions differently from “conventional” time. Foucault claims that time is perceived in 
two extremes in heterotopias: time as eternal and time as temporary and fleeting. 
Heterotopias in which time is perceived as fleeting are “the fairgrounds, these marvelous 
empty sites on the outskirts of cities that teem once or twice a year with stands, displays, 
heteroclite objects, wrestlers, snakewomen, fortune-tellers, and so forth” (Foucault 26). 
In contrast, museums and libraries are heterotopias “in which time never stops building 
up and topping its own summit” (Foucault 26). Similarly, the labyrinth, too, follows its 
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own internal framework of time. For example, the labyrinth of street festivals in Beirut 
transforms the walkers’ perception of space and time. At a first glance, the street festival 
is a labyrinth of walking crowds. The walker is temporarily disoriented as the space 
ceases to function as it ordinarily does. Streets are closed off to cars, stands, temporary 
stages, and displays are set up causing this space to temporarily follow a time pattern 
that is different from that of conventional time, one which is centered upon seeking 
pleasure and entertainment.    
The fifth principle is that heterotopias are porous, accessible spaces in spite of 
their isolation. Certain heterotopic sites require permission upon entry. For instance, to 
pray inside a mosque, one must perform ablutions. Likewise, in order to enter the 
theater, one must purchase a ticket. Other openings to heterotopias are deceptive in that 
they appear simple, but on entering, one is instantly secluded. In a motel, a man and his 
mistress are able to have sexual relations in an isolated time-space. The system of 
access, entry and exit act in response to the “presence-absence of lived space” and “the 
‘mechanisms of opening and closing’, of access and exclusion, entrance and exit, 
are…temporal systems, responding to the absence-presence of lived space” (Cenzatti 
81). Like the heterotopia, the labyrinth is also accessible to those outside; the limited 
number of entrances and exits permit the walker to enter and leave (with greater 
difficulty) the labyrinth.  
The final principle follows from the fifth and asserts that heterotopias have a 
function in relation to the external space they are a part of. Thus, heterotopias create 
alternative time-spaces which would not have been allowed to temporalize in the spaces 
outside the hetertopia. Likewise, the labyrinth as a real and imagined space comes to 
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house the untold stories of the marginal which also are often not permitted to 
temporalize beyond the tortuous path of the labyrinth.  
Foucault’s notion of heterotopias has been critiqued for its vagueness; 
furthermore, it is concept which can apply to all spaces thus it becomes meaningless. 
Benjamin Genocchio argues such a conception of heterotopias is insignificant because 
all sites can be opposed against an Other; “Scouring the absolute limits of imagination, 
the question then becomes what cannot be designated a heterotopia?” (39). He does not 
entirely dismiss this concept, but rather states that:  
The heterotopia is thus more an idea about space than any actual place. It is an 
idea that insists that the ordering of spatial systems is subjective and arbitrary in 
that we know nothing of the initial totality that it must presuppose. (43) 
Kevin Hetherington, however, claims that heteropias “are more than just ideas 
about space. Certainly they are not sites that exist in themselves, they are relational; 
heterotopic –but it is also how that relationship is established that is significant” (48). 
When recognized as relational spaces, it becomes important to explore the reasons for 
their construction and existence, as the relationship between individuals and their 
surrounding space is mutual. Moreover, what is lacking in Foucault’s theory is whether 
the “space-time constellations that he describes do have the same meaning for all actors 
involved” (Heynen 320). Does the prostitute who works in the heterotopic space of the 
brothel have the same ‘liberating’ experience as the bourgeois male visitor? (Heynen 
320). Similarly the space of the labyrinth may have different implications which depend 
on its function and significance; one person’s labyrinth may be another person’s refuge.   
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Although we are able to alter the external space in a multitude of ways, often, the 
nature of the physical space also influences the type of social relations that can occur 
within a given space, for “the characteristics of the physical space give shape and even 
impose limits on what kind of representation can be produced there” (Cenzatti 80).  For 
instance, an alleyway is more suited for illicit actions (drug dealing, prostitution) than 
for street festivals (Cenzatti 81). At times, space imposes its order, and we become 
helpless before it. Such is the space of the labyrinth. As a conceived space, the labyrinth 
is a physical and architectural structure designed to delude, mislead, and confuse the 
walker with its winding paths and dead ends. Yet, as a representational space, the 
labyrinth also creates possibilities; in spite of being lost, the walker must choose certain 
paths over others in his attempt to escape.   
The labyrinth is well-suited to evolve in the city where relationships among 
inhabitants and their space in all its aspects (historical, cultural, social, political, 
technological, and economic) have become very much complex and convoluted in 
nature. The evolution of labyrinths, then, is a natural by-product of this complexity, and 
it becomes the shape which allows this intricacy to be expressed (physically and 
metaphorically) in a space of a sort. In the Badlands of Modernity, Hetherington builds 
on Foucault’s theory and states that “heterotopias are the sites of limit experiences, 
notably those associated with the freedoms of madness, sexual desire and death in which 
humans experience the limits of their existence and are controlled by its sublime terror” 
(46). Such limit experiences are also encountered in the space of the labyrinth. As stated 
in the Introduction, the journey through the labyrinth often forces the walker to confront 
hidden Minotaurs that mask such limit experiences.  
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Deemed invisible city spaces, labyrinths (spatially and metaphorically) reveal 
insights and characteristics about human nature, their spaces, and their psyches. These 
experiences are given the potential to temporalize through literary works. As Peter 
Middleton and Tim Woods contest in Literatures of Memory, “[t]he city is both the site 
of authority and social control, and the place where the evasion of authority can become 
most self-aware, which is why so much of the best recent fiction gravitates towards 
representatives of urban space and cities” (281). In the hidden, forgotten, and overlooked 
spaces of city are such spaces expressed through fiction and language, as they fight for 
their place in history. 
1.3 Labyrinths in City of Glass and Biritus madīna taḥta al-arḍ 
In the novel City of Glass by Paul Auster, the structure of the labyrinth manifests 
itself through the city of New York which is itself an endless labyrinth. Very much 
aware of his presence in the labyrinth of New York, the protagonist Daniel Quinn enjoys 
the freedom that comes with aimlessly and wandering through the tortuous paths of the 
city. The moment that he tries to search for meaning and certainty, he is doomed to 
become a prisoner of a labyrinth of his own construction. The labyrinth in Biritus 
madīna taḥta al-arḍ by Rabī’ Jābir exists as an underground urban space; the fictitious 
city of Beirut below is a mazy, stone structure in which the inhabitants themselves 
become easily lost. Buṭrus remains unable to make sense of this subterranean labyrinth. 
Thus, he learns that the labyrinth has a distinct order which he perceives as a disorder, 
for he remains unable to comprehend it.  
What is significant about the labyrinths in the novels is that they manifest 
themselves in two forms; labyrinths as physical spaces and labyrinths as intangible, 
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internal constructions in the characters’ minds. For Quinn, this internal labyrinth is 
represented through his construction of an atemporal language, one that cannot be 
sustained outside the labyrinth. Buṭrus, on the other hand, discovers that this 
underground city of the past forces him into an internal labyrinth of memory. The 
journey through the labyrinth is transformed into an internal one, leaving the walker a 
changed individual. 
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Chapter Two 
Representations of Labyrinths in City of Glass and 
Biritus madīna taḥta al-arḍ 
In the preface to The Order of Things, Foucault claims that heterotopias function 
to disrupt order. He cites a passage from Borges’ short story “The Analytical Language 
of John Wilkins” to illustrate this. The character Wilkins sets out to devise a language 
that would organize and cover all human ideas. His classification categorizes animals as 
follows: 
(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) 
sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) 
frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel hairbrush, (l) et 
cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off 
look like flies. (xvi) 
According to Foucault, the ludicrousness of the classification does not result 
from the juxtaposition of the items listed but from the “fact that the common ground on 
which such meetings are possible has itself been destroyed” (xvii). The common space 
which ought to hold the objects in Wilkins’s classification together is shattered. This 
destruction, however, produces a new space, one that is governed by its own internal 
rules and that remains unknowable to those outside this space. As such, this order which 
is understood only by Wilkins, remains inaccessible to the reader.  By juxtaposing the 
unrelated elements, Borges’ taxonomy, a labyrinth itself, produces a new order. The 
incomprehensible relationship between the juxtaposed elements presents the reader with 
a textual and conceptual quandary. Like Foucault who described his “shattered” laughter 
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upon reading Borges’ passage, the reader is taken into a labyrinth which is created by 
the mere placement of elements in a series (a, b, c, d) indicating that a relationship ought 
to exist between them (Foucault xvi). It is in this manner that the labyrinth functions; the 
walker lost within its paths uncovers a new order which may clash with the world 
outside. Thus, labyrinths, like heterotopias, produce a new, distinct order of their own.  
To demonstrate how heterotopias create spaces with an alternative order, Robert 
J. Topinka makes a reference to another short story written by Borges, “Funes el 
Memorioso” which translates to “Funes the Memorious”. As a young man, Funes suffers 
a horse accident which leaves him paralyzed. Funes discovers, however, that the 
accident opens in his mind an agonizingly infallible memory; “In fact, Funes 
remembered not only every leaf of every tree of every wood, but also every one of the 
times he had perceived or imagined it” (Borges 65). His memory prevents him from 
utilizing his old ways of knowing and thinking. To cope with his newly discovered 
memory, Funes creates a new way of ordering knowledge even if this is only in the 
imagined space of language (Topinka 69).  
His memory becomes a heterotopic space (and a labyrinth), for he “attempts to 
reorder language to fit the intensely full spaces of his memory” (Topinka 69). Funes 
describes his memory as a “garbage heap”; it prevents him from returning to his old 
ways of thinking and ordering knowledge. He invents a system of numbering whereby 
each number corresponds to a word: “In place of seven thousand thirteen, he would say 
(for example) Máximo Pérez; in place of seven thousand fourteen, he would say The 
Railroad” (Borges 64). He can no longer conceive of generalizations. Each moment (and 
memory) becomes so particular that his perception is based on immediate senses; “To 
think is to forget differences, generalize, make abstractions. In the teeming world of 
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Funes, there were only details, almost immediate in their presence” (Borges 66). He is 
unable to comprehend that “the generic symbol dog embraces so many unlike 
individuals of diverse form; it bothered him that the dog at three fourteen (seen from the 
side) should have the same name as the dog at three fifteen (seen from the front)” 
(Borges 65). Consequently, he is forced to create a new system of ordering his 
knowledge, one that is not based on generalizations (Topinka 69).  
However, he soon realizes the futility of his reordering projects and gives up on 
finding an alternative method to restructure his memories and knowledge. In the end, he 
finds solace only when he attempts to escape to a space which holds no memories:  
Off toward the east, in an area that had not yet been cut up into city blocks, there 
were new houses, unfamiliar to Ireneo. He pictured them to himself as black, 
compact, made of homogenous shadow; he would turn his head in that direction 
to sleep. (Borges 66) 
Like Funes’s memory, labyrinths can create alternative spaces which often allow for the 
production of new ways of (re)ordering knowledge causing us to question the ground on 
which our order stands. However, unlike Funes who perhaps finds some comfort in 
imagining spaces not yet tinted by his memory, we are often unable to do the same. We 
become stuck in an ‘in-between’ space, unable to go back to our old ways, unable to 
move forward within our new frame of thought. Borges’s short stories are fitting for the 
discussion of labyrinths, as they illustrate a labyrinth of the mind which is often the most 
difficult to escape.   
The time-space of the labyrinth permits realities (which would otherwise not be 
allowed to unfurl) to produce their own spatial practices, representations of space, and 
representational spaces that are often characterized by marginality, deviation and 
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difference. What is significant about such spaces is their ability to produce “alternative 
modes of ordering; they have their own codes, rules, and symbols and they generate 
their own relations of power” ( Hetherington 24).  
Paul Auster’s City of Glass illustrates how the characters produce an order which 
can only be sustained in the space of the labyrinth. This new order manifests itself in the 
form of a new language; it produces a labyrinth for this invented language cannot be 
understood by those outside this space and order. Rabī’ Jābir’s Biritus madīna taḥta al-
arḍ unveils a city with a distinct order that is perceived as a disorder by the protagonist, 
Boutrous, who is taken layers beneath the earth into a physical city-labyrinth.  
2.1 A New (Dis)Order in City of Glass and Biritus madīna taḥta al-arḍ 
The New York Trilogy by Paul Auster is composed of three stories: City of Glass 
(1985), Ghosts (1985), and The Locked Room (1986). While the three novellas are set in 
New York City, City of Glass depicts the physical labyrinth of New York and its impact 
on the characters most explicitly. In City of Glass, the protagonist Daniel Quinn 
becomes entrapped in a labyrinth of language, for he is unable to decipher the newly 
uncovered order which manifests itself in the form of an invented language. Eventually, 
he himself becomes a part of the labyrinth as he invents a particular language which 
remains inaccessible to the lost reader (walker) unable to decipher its meaning. The 
characters’ labyrinths are produced through their construction of a ‘new’ language; thus, 
the outsider who is incapable of comprehending this language is taken into a textual 
labyrinth.   
One evening, mystery novel writer Quinn gets several phone calls inquiring of a 
private eye Paul Auster (who also happens to be the author of the novella itself). After 
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many attempts to tell the persistent caller that he is not Auster, Quinn finally assumes 
Auster’s identity and agrees to meet the anonymous caller. The caller turns out to be a 
psychologically and emotionally disturbed Peter Stillman Jr. who hires Auster (Quinn) 
to track his father, Peter Stillman Sr. Stillman Sr. who was put in prison for isolating his 
son for nine years as part of his social experiment to find the prelapsarian language. His 
obsession with finding the language of God is evident through a book he had written in 
his early career in which he reinterprets the story of the Tower of Babel. Stillman Jr. 
hires Auster because his father is to be released from prison and is a potential threat to 
his son. Upon taking the case, Quinn finds himself in a labyrinth of language; there, he 
not only uncovers but also produces a new (linguistic) order. The labyrinth of language 
functions very much like a physical labyrinth; to the lost walker who cannot understand 
this system, it is a riddle to be deciphered. Thus, to Quinn, the inaccessible languages of 
Stillman Jr. and Stillman Sr. become labyrinths, for he can never decipher their 
utterances and uncover the meaning of their words. 
As Stillman Jr. tells Quinn the story of his childhood, his language, fragmented 
and perplexing, takes Quinn into a labyrinth: “Dark, dark. They say for nine years. Not 
even a window. Poor Peter Stillman. And the boom, boom, boom. The caca piles. The 
pipi lakes. The swoons. Excuse me. Numb and naked. Excuse me. Anymore” (Auster 
16). His madness has to be expressed through its own language and space, thus Stillman 
Jr. attempts to order his world using alternative methods which remain inaccessible to 
those outside the labyrinth. He asserts that he is a poet who makes up words, yet he is 
the only person who understands the meaning of these untranslatable invented words 
(Auster 19). Stillman Jr. produces a new linguistic order which remains inaccessible to 
the outsider. In this textual labyrinth, the role of the lost walker (reader) is to attempt to 
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construct interpretations that never yield certainties. This is evocative of being placed at 
the forking paths of a labyrinth, where each choice has endless outcomes and 
consequences, and the walker continuously ponders whether the choice made is the 
‘right’ one. 
Similarly, when Quinn surreptitiously trails Stillman Sr.’s paths, he observes that 
Stillman roams the streets collecting worthless objects (Auster 59). He begins to 
question Stillman’s curious wanderings, “ransacking the chaos of Stillman’s movements 
for some glimmer of cogency” (Auster 68-69). He searches for meaning in what appears 
to be a meaningless pursuit and becomes certain that each path spells a letter. After 
drawing Stillman’s paths, Quinn realizes that they had spelled the letters “OWERO 
BAB” reminding him of “TOWER OF BABEL”, the topic of Stillman’s book (Auster 
70). Quinn attempts to construct meaning by ‘reading’ Stillman’s paths just as one 
continuously searches for an exit in a physical labyrinth. Hence, the act of walking 
becomes synonymous with the act of writing, for walking is “to the urban system what 
the speech act is to language or to the statements uttered” (Certeau 97). Perhaps this is 
why Quinn convinces himself of the certainty of meaning behind Stillman’s movements. 
Stillman’s trajectories become his “space of enunciation” and his ‘uttered’ words 
(Certeau 98). Because Quinn is unable to decipher Stillman’s paths, he becomes 
entrapped in a labyrinth of language, unable to find an exit or a definitive meaning to 
Stillman’s words. 
Deducing that Stillman Sr. is not a threat to his son, Quinn decides to address 
him in order to uncover his true intentions. He converses with Stillman Sr. on three 
occasions, each time introducing himself as different person. The first time Quinn 
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speaks to Stillman Sr., he introduces himself as Daniel Quinn (an alias as he is under the 
assumed identity of Auster). Stillman Sr. reveals that he is in the process of inventing a 
new language (Auster 76). He explains:  
A language that will say what we have to say. For our words no longer 
correspond to the world…Consider a word that refers to a thing—
‘umbrella’…When I say the word ‘umbrella’, you see the object in your 
mind…Not only is an umbrella a thing, it is a thing that performs a function—in 
other words, expresses the will of man…What happens when a thing no longer 
performs its function? Is it still the thing, or has it become something else? 
(Auster 77)       
According to Stillman, a broken umbrella cannot be labeled an ‘umbrella’ because it 
ceases to fulfill its function. He tells Quinn of his endeavor to create a new language; he 
roams the streets picking up meaningless objects, giving new names to the objects he 
collects. Stillman Sr. creates “new words that will corresponds to the things” (Auster 
78). On his second meeting with Stillman Sr., Quinn introduces himself to Stillman as 
Henry Dark. The reader discovers that Henry Dark (whose initials stand for Humpty 
Dumpty) is the invented character in Stillaman’s book (and Stillman Sr.’s alter ego). As 
Stillman Sr. explains, Humpty Dumpty (who is paradoxically an egg which has not yet 
been born) is a philosopher of language; he is an egg that speaks and in speaking, 
affirms its existence (Auster 81). Stillman goes on to quote an excerpt from chapter six 
of Lewis Caroll’s Through the Looking Glass: 
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means 
just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’ ‘The question is’, said 
41 
 
Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’ ‘The 
question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master—that’s all.’ (qtd. in 
Auster 81) 
Stillman Sr., thus, attempts to find a general and comprehensive language that can create 
a newly recovered order of the world, the case prior to the disaster of the Tower of 
Babel. Like John Wilkins in Borges’ Chinese Encyclopedia who set out to devise a 
language which would include all human terminology and thought, Stillman Sr. 
unsuccessfully endeavors to “master time by mastering language” (Söderlind 11). This 
alternative ordering of language is opposed to conventional language, for conventional 
language “is completely linked to, and indeed formed by, history, hence always belated 
and insufficient, but nevertheless a functional necessary convention” (Söderlind 11). The 
languages that the two Stillmans produce are part of a synchronic system which end 
once the relations that have produced them end. Therefore, their language is 
characterized by atemporality. Stillman Sr. claims, “Unless we can begin to embody the 
notion of change in the words we use, we will continue to be lost” (Auster 77-78). He 
undertakes the task of reaching a state of linguistic permanence forgetting that time 
cannot be ‘controlled’ and surely not through language, for when words become 
‘whole’, they lose their function and become unnecessary.  
 Because their words are inaccessible and untranslatable, therefore ‘unmappable’, 
they come to resemble the space of the labyrinth. A language that cannot be ‘accessed’ 
is a labyrinth to the one attempting to decipher its meaning. Quinn “wondered if Peter 
[Stillman Jr.] saw the same things he did, or whether the world was a different place for 
him. And if a tree was not a tree, he wondered what it really was” (Auster 36). Like 
Quinn, we too are left to wonder what a tree truly means to Stillman Jr. or what a broken 
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umbrella means to his father.  These meanings are inaccessible to those outside this 
linguistic order. Consequently, we are left to decipher what these words signify; there 
are endless possibilities. Similarly, in the labyrinth, the walker is forced to choose paths 
without knowing where they will lead, yet hoping that they will lead to an exit; we 
become Minotaurs stuck in a labyrinth, unable to understand its order and find our way 
out. 
Quinn himself also produces his own labyrinth as he unsuccessfully endeavors to 
control his language by controlling his written words. Upon taking the Stillman case, he 
purchases a red notebook in which he keeps his notes, believing that it “would be helpful 
to have a separate place to record his thoughts, his observations, and his questions. In 
that way, perhaps, things might not get out of control” (38). To Quinn’s dismay, 
however, things do get out of control. Like Minos who creates the labyrinth to control 
reality and contain the Minotaur, Quinn attempts to control his own reality through 
containing his words. He produces a space (the red notebook) where words are written to 
stay on the page—not to be scattered, interpreted, and misinterpreted. When Stillman Sr. 
meets Quinn for the first time, he mockingly tells Quinn, “I see many possibilities for 
this word, this Quinn, this…quintessence…of quiddity. Quick, for example. And quill. 
And quack. And quirk…I like your name enormously, Mr. Quinn. It flies off in so many 
little directions at once” (Auster 74). Like the space of the labyrinth, the space of 
language is a space of possibilities. Quinn’s name which “flies off in so many little 
directions” is reminiscent of the journey through the labyrinth where the lost walker 
must make decisions upon reaching a forking path; each decision brings forth new 
possibilities. Yet neither Minos nor Quinn is successful in his attempt to manipulate 
reality, for such spaces are bound to spin out of control. He abandons conventional 
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language only to become a prisoner of the space of the red notebook. Realizing that he 
has neared the end of the notebook, Quinn tried: 
to weigh his words with great care, struggling to express himself as economically 
and clearly as possible. He regretted having wasted so many pages at the 
beginning of the red notebook, and in fact felt sorry that he had bothered to write 
about the Stillman case at all. (Auster 131) 
The act of writing becomes synonymous with ‘being’; words become an essential 
component of his existence. As the space for his words run out, his being comes to an 
end. He tries “to face the end of the red notebook with courage” (Auster 132). The final 
sentence in the notebooks reads, “What will happen when there are no more pages in the 
red notebook?” (Auster 132). This takes the reader into yet another labyrinth, for one is 
left to wonder of Quinn’s fate. Does his labyrinth evolve into yet another space or is it 
simply destroyed? In this textual labyrinth, possibilities are multiplied but never 
confirmed. We are not as fortunate as Thesus or the Minotaur who are certain of their 
fate. We are left to wonder and to wander in our own labyrinths.  
In Biritus, Buṭrus uncovers an underground labyrinth beneath present-day Beirut. 
Like Quinn, Buṭrus’s journey through the underground labyrinth takes him to a time-
space governed by a distinct order. The novel Biritus madīna taḥta al-arḍ by Rabī’ Jābir 
investigates the relationship between an aboveground city and an imagined underground 
labyrinth existing beneath it. The discovery of an underground labyrinth unearths a new 
time-space with an order that cannot be sustained in the world above, for the forces that 
maintain its continuity are not present. In this space, the order produced by the state of 
stagnation in the city below is best illustrated by Buṭrus’s discovery that the 
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underground city itself is doomed to death; perhaps it is making way for a new layer of 
history with a set of entirely different social relations and forces revealing that the past 
cannot be assimilated through the lens of the present. Unable to entirely grasp the order 
of the city below, Buṭrus realizes that his sole choice is to escape the labyrinth or perish 
along with it.   
Published over one decade after the end of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-90), 
the novel begins in a reconstructed modern cosmopolitan Beirut. Jābir’s Biritus begins in 
a flourishing Beirut where the narrator (the character Jābir himself) is having dinner with 
friends in one of Beirut’s rooftop restaurants. The men are approached by a pale, sickly-
looking man (Jābir 10). Jābir finally recognizes the man who turns out to be a security 
guard named Buṭrus. Buṭrus chooses to tell his tale of his experiences in the 
underground world to Jābir (who like the ‘real’ Jābir is a writer by profession). He 
deems Jābir the ideal person to tell his story to, for he admires his ability to maintain 
realistic elements in his fictional narratives (Jābir 15). A shift in narration from Jābir to 
Buṭrus sees that Buṭrus becomes the narrator, telling Jābir of his journey through the 
underground labyrinth.  
He is forced into the labyrinth below when on duty one night, he falls (chasing a 
childlike figure) through a hole into an undiscovered underground city. Buṭrus later 
discovers that this childlike figure is, in fact, Yasmīna, a grown woman he falls in love 
with in the underground city (Jābir 25). His physical injuries prevent him from 
immediately returning to the upper world, and he unwillingly remains below until he 
regains his strength many months later.  
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Although the aboveground Beirut and the subterranean Beirut exist in parallel to 
one another, the underground Beirut is an ‘other’ place when compared to its 
aboveground counterpart. As Pike illustrates in Metropolis on the Styx: 
While aboveground space may be defined positively by the aspiration toward 
homogeneity, the underground is defined negatively by its failure to be or to 
remain homogeneous according to the same model. Whenever any space ceases 
to be adequate to the constraints of its conceived role in a particular discourse, it 
reverts to the world below as represented by that discourse in the same way that a 
once desirable neighborhood becomes a slum or an exhausted mine engenders a 
ghost town. (14)  
 In the eerie labyrinthine city below, untold stories linger in hidden spaces 
beneath the ground. Thus, as described in Chapter One, the underground spaces (which 
are often labyrinthine in nature) often become reserved for the marginal entities in 
society that the world outside the labyrinth cannot sustain. For instance, vagabonds may 
find refuge in the subterranean mazy spaces of subway stations.  
Geographically, the subterranean city and the aboveground city are connected on 
a vertical access, but temporally, they are conjoined through a horizontal one, namely 
time. This geographical vertical axis physically separates the two spaces such that the 
space of the underground becomes an ‘otherworld’ in relation to the world above. The 
underground is often the space wherein “the trash heap of the world above, the place to 
which everyone, everything, and every place posing a problem or no longer useful is 
relegated “(Pike Metropolis on the Styx 2). The labyrinth of Berytus unveils Boutrous’s 
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deepest fears and memories which gradually return as he treads the paths of the labyrinth 
below.   
In spite of being an ‘other’ world, the underground space is porous thus is not 
entirely isolated from the world above. The events in the upper world impact the city 
existing meters beneath. In Biritus, the inhabitants below can choose to depart to the 
upper world. For instance, Yasmīna leaves the labyrinth when she pleases (Jābir 23). 
The astronomer Salmān also tells Buṭrus that Yasmīna’s disappeared husband had not 
died as the others have told him but has left to the world above (Jābir 78). This 
accessibility is also exhibited in the manner the events above significantly impact the 
underground city. The Lebanese Civil War, which the inhabitants below called the ‘dark 
period’, had dire consequences on the underground city. Many inhabitants suffocated as 
a result of the smoke which infiltrated the city below (Jābir 94). Furthermore, the bombs 
and explosions often caused the ceilings to collapse on the inhabitants (Jābir 87). The 
remnants of the war remain in the city above as much as they do in the city beneath the 
ground.   
During periods of war above, the underground Beirut once functioned as a 
refuge, for inhabitants of upper Beirut seeped into the city below in search of security 
and protection. As the historian Mas’ūd tells Buṭrus, victims of famine in the early 
1900s descended the city below in search of food and protection (Jābir 107). This 
function of the city below, however, evolves over time. As the social relations which had 
produced this space are eliminated, the underground city ceases to function as it once 
did. No longer a safe haven from the world above, this labyrinth evolves into a dark, 
threatening space. The narrator Buṭrus yearns for upper Beirut and eagerly awaits the 
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day he is well enough to escape. Although the city-labyrinth is a home for the 
inhabitants below, it comes to resemble a real-life hell for Buṭrus. The nature of a space, 
then, is “determined by an allegiance either to conceived or to lived space: one person’s 
subterranean hole is another one’s home; one person’s lucrative and productive factory 
is another one’s living hell” (Pike Metropolis 17-18). This ambivalence is very much 
linked to one’s perception of a space. If a space is perceived as transient, one accepts to 
be temporarily held within its walls (as a catacomb or sewer one visits). However, if this 
space is understood to be permanent, it takes the “symbolic status of a tomb or of a hell” 
(Pike Metropolis 17-18). Similarly, from the perspective of the inhabitants below, the 
stone labyrinth provides refuge and protection from the world above. The inhabitants 
fear the outside world and believe that they will be blinded by the light of the sun if they 
are exposed to the upper city (Jābir 122). If an inhabitant decides to leave to the 
aboveground city, they deem him dead (Jābir 78). In the eyes of Buṭrus, however, the 
city is a space to be escaped. Buṭrus realizes that the world below is best forgotten, for it 
is a world that is stuck in time. Yet, the task of forgetting becomes impossible as the 
journey through the labyrinth brings to the surface Boutrous’s memories of a horrendous 
past. 
In this city-labyrinth beneath Beirut, Buṭrus uncovers a new order which he 
cannot assimilate. Because he is unable to understand the order below, he has no choice 
but to escape this stone labyrinth or remain eternally lost within its paths. Gradually, he 
begins to understand that the order in the city below clashes with the order above, thus 
he cannot comprehend it. For instance, the inhabitants below cannot conceive of large 
numbers. When Buṭrus inquires of the population of the city, his host Isḥāq responds by 
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asking Buṭrus of the population above. Buṭrus replies that there are approximately one 
million inhabitants living above. After thinking upon the question, Isḥāq also maintains 
there are also one million inhabitants in the city below (Jābir 52). When Buṭrus later 
poses the same question to the astronomer Salmān, he explains that the inhabitants do 
not know of large numbers, stating that the city’s population does not exceed one 
thousand people. Or perhaps ten thousand; Salmān cannot remember (Jābir 90)! Because 
this system of organizing knowledge is not utilized in the world below, the inhabitants 
cannot conceive of it.  
Similarly, Salmān later informs Buṭrus of the peculiar political system in the 
underground city. Although a president is elected annually, this process is a difficult 
one, for no one is eager to become a president. Salmān reveals that the life of a president 
is challenging, as the elected president is not permitted to leave the palace or to interact 
with others (expect for his wives who transmit information from the external world) 
(Jābir 89). He clarifies that, at present, they only elect presidents in order to maintain 
traditions. Salmān cannot even remember the name of the current president in spite of 
the fact that he was elected a few days earlier (Jābir 90). He also informs Buṭrus that 
they have ministers but their number is unknown. Salmān asserts that, at times, all the 
inhabitants below are ministers (Jābir 89)! This contradictory information leaves Buṭrus 
feeling confused and sullen. He is unable to comprehend this information, for it clashes 
with the order in the upper world. Not only does Buṭrus fail to comprehend the system 
below, but the inhabitants of underground Beirut are also unable to grasp the order of the 
city above. Salmān’s limited knowledge of the upper city prevents him from 
understanding Buṭrus. He asks Buṭrus to describe the trees that once covered the city. 
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Buṭrus explains that many of the trees had been removed to create space for residential 
areas. Unable to comprehend this, Salmān questions why the trees have to be eliminated 
when, according to him, there is enough light to sustain all the trees above. 
The geography of the underground city imposes a certain (dis)order on the 
inhabitants, and they are helpless before it. As the astronomer Salmān reveals to Buṭrus, 
the city below was originally built to be a labyrinth with the presidential palace at its 
center (Jābir 86). Because the city below is an underground labyrinth, the inhabitants’ 
actions are restricted by the geography. The absence of maps poses a constant threat to 
the inhabitants below. The only character who has a map is the astronomer Salmān. To 
illustrate the importance of the map, Buṭrus recalls an incident involving his host’s 
daughter, Raḥīl. Prior to leaving her home to visit a nearby neighborhood, Raḥīl ties one 
end of a long rope around her arm and gives the other end to Buṭrus. She warns Buṭrus 
not to release the rope for fear that she will never find her way back (Jābir 92). The 
winding paths of the labyrinth do not only pose physical threats for the lost walker but 
also psychological ones; the inhabitants continuously live in fear of getting lost. 
Consequently, the walker of the labyrinth is left feeling disoriented and confused as he 
treads the path of the labyrinth. Furthermore, their geography also imposes a temporal 
order on the inhabitants below. In the underground spaces, time is no longer governed 
by the passage of day and night as the sunlight does not reach such depths (the temporal 
experience of the labyrinth will be addressed in Chapter Three).       
Buṭrus observes that the inhabitants below favor expressing themselves through 
body language as opposed to words, and in certain situations, they do not use words at 
all (Jābir 104). They avoid making loud noises for fear that the ceilings would collapse, 
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thus they speak in whispers and murmurs and rely on body language. Like the atemporal 
language that Stillman the father and Stillman the son construct and use, the body 
language employed in the world below is also atemporal; it is fleeting thus cannot be 
sustained in the world outside the labyrinth.  
The only way Buṭrus is able to make sense of the labyrinth below is through 
maintaining a certain degree of control over his spatial surroundings. To make sense of 
the disorder of the labyrinth, Buṭrus attempts to identify his geographical location using 
markers of the world above. Although Salmān tells him that they are beneath al-‘Umari 
Mosque, Buṭrus is skeptical of this and believes they are likely situated not directly 
beneath the mosque but in a nearby street. Salmān’s map of the world below reminds 
Buṭrus of the old, pre-war upper Beirut. To eliminate the sense of confusion and 
disorientation he feels in the underground city-labyrinth, Buṭrus tries to map his location 
using markers from the city above. Salmān remembers the landmarks of an older, pre-
war Beirut, and he describes the old souks which Buṭrus is unfamiliar with and only 
remembers seeing as a child (Jābir 87). When Buṭrus sees the map of the underground 
city for the first time, he describes it as a labyrinth and is unable to decipher it as a result 
of its intricate lines and overlapping paths (Jābir 154). Is it possible, then, to draw a map 
of the labyrinth? The only way to do so is to use geographical markers he is familiar 
with. He recognizes that the map of underground Beirut resembles that of an older upper 
Beirut, the only difference being the number of gates and the manner in which they are 
distributed (Jābir 154). Thus, he attempts to make sense of this city-labyrinth by 
resituating himself in a space he is familiar with.  
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The order that is characterized by stagnation is illustrated through the presence of 
objects which have lost their function. The rarity of books in the city is indicative of an 
inability to progress. Salmān himself only has one book and the public library houses 
just over twenty books (Jābir 83). He is unable to read the old books which are in a poor 
condition; he fears that they will disintegrate if they are touched (Jābir 82). Similarly, 
the lantern in Isḥāq’s home does not work, and it is placed on the wall only for 
decorative purposes. It no longer has a connection with its intended function, reminding 
us of Stillman’s umbrella theory. In this labyrinth, words have, in fact, lost their 
function. The neighborhoods bear names of an ancient past which has no connection 
with their present. According to Salmān, Isḥāq’s ancestors had been Jewish, and his 
neighborhood had once been called ‘the neighborhood of the Jews’. This, however, had 
changed with time as Salmān claims that nothing remains of religion except names; the 
inhabitants below do not pray (Jābir 83). The artist Buṭrus meets as he visits various 
parts of the city tells of the salmon which once lived in the underground river before it 
had dried up. He shows Buṭrus his paintings of the salmon, some of which had been 
painted before the river had dried up and others had been painted after. Buṭrus exclaims 
that the paintings are identical but according to the artist, they are not. The artist tells 
him that he does not know how to paint anything else nor does he want to (Jābir 177). 
His inability to produce anything new reflects the city’s inability to progress. The 
nearing death of the city is further illustrated by the women’s sterility. The order of the 
city below is reminiscent of a dying, war-torn Beirut. Thus, his journey through the 
labyrinth is in fact a journey to a past Beirut which Buṭrus realizes has an order which 
cannot be entirely assimilated.  
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2.2 Mirroring as a Condition of Labyrinths  
The labyrinth is never entirely isolated from the external world; oftentimes, it is a 
product of the world outside. As stated in Chapter One, the labyrinth can become a space 
which holds and contains the ‘waste’ of the external world; Minos attempts to eliminate 
the Minotaur from his reality by containing him in the labyrinth. The labyrinth, then, 
comes to represent the marginal individuals and/or collectives who cannot find a space 
to temporalize in society. As a result, the labyrinth becomes a space which mirrors 
hidden and unwanted aspects of the world outside.   
The juxtaposition of several sites within a given space (a characteristic of 
heterotopias) is seen in the labyrinth as a mirroring effect that is produced by merely 
walking in the labyrinth. Inside the labyrinth, the walker is unable to tell one path from 
another, for the paths often appear similar. The walker believes he has stumbled on an 
exit only to realize that he is back on the same lost path. Just as one is often unable to 
tell one path from the other in the physical labyrinth, the mirroring of characters in City 
of Glass produces a similar effect in this textual labyrinth. The labyrinth is born out of 
the duplicate characters and spaces that appear to mirror one another. Certainty dissolves 
as nothing is but a reflection: 
Mirroring is everywhere…and that Quinn goes through the looking glass when 
he enters the world of the Stillmans is explicit, as he takes the bus from West 96
th
 
street to get to Stillman's apartment on East 69
th
, which is where his story really 
begins. (Söderlind 3) 
After Quinn’s final encounter with Stillman Sr., Stillman disappears. A confused 
Quinn searches for the ‘real’ Paul Auster hoping that he may have answers to his 
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dilemma. However, Quinn is surprised to learn that the only Paul Auster in the phone 
book is a writer, not a detective. When he finally visits Auster, Quinn identifies a 
reflection of his former life as a writer, father, and husband after meeting Auster’s wife 
and son. In Auster’s family, he sees a reflection of his forgotten past, “Quinn's Ideal I, 
the writer who is also a happy family man” (Söderlind 9).   
The mirroring is not only seen as doubling one’s image but as tripling it, further 
highlighting the experience of the labyrinth. With binaries, one is conceived against an 
‘other’ in an ‘either-or’ category. By destroying the conventional binaries of our 
thought, tripling unveils possibilities. The binaries themselves are not dismissed but are 
“subjected to a creative process of restructuring that draws selectively and strategically 
from the two opposing strategies to open new alternatives” (Soja 5). Quinn’s fragmented 
identity is also composed of a triad: Daniel Quinn (whose initials mirror Don Quixote’s), 
William Wilson
2
 (the alias under which he wrote his mystery novels), and Max Work 
(the detective protagonist of his mystery novels). The fragmentation is illustrated 
through his ability to see each character as a disparate identity; “Because he did not 
consider himself to be the author of what he wrote, he did not feel responsible for it and 
therefore was not compelled to defend it in his heart” (Auster 4).  This tripling of his 
identity is further illustrated in the meaning of “private eye” which had a threefold 
meaning for Quinn: The letter ‘i’ for investigator, the ‘I’ “in the upper case” representing 
the subject, and the “physical eye of the writer, the eye of the man who looks out from 
himself into the world and demands that the world reveal itself to him” (Auster 8). Thus, 
Quinn comes to embody the three meanings as he moves from writer to detective to 
writer once more—from the “physical eye of the writer” to the lower case ‘i’ of the 
                                                          
2
 The name is based on Edgar Allan Poe’s short story “William Wilson” which is about a doppelganger.   
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investigator to the upper case ‘I’ of the subject, “the tiny life-bud buried in the body of 
the breathing self” (Auster 8).   
The characters also appear in threes, each mirroring the other. Quinn, meets three 
Stilmans: Stillman Jr. (the son), Stillman Sr. (the father), and a third Stillman look-alike. 
As he waits for Stillman Sr. to arrive at the train station, he is met with a third Stillman; 
“Directly behind Stillman, heaving into view just inches behind his right shoulder, 
another man stopped, took a lighter out of his pocket, and lit a cigarette. His face was the 
exact twin of Stillman’s” (Auster 56). Similarly, there are also three Peters: Peter 
Stillman Jr. (the troubled son), Peter Stillman Sr. (the disturbed father), and Peter Quinn 
(Quinn’s dead son). Auster’s son is named Daniel which is also Quinn’s first name. 
Quinn’s initials also mirror Don Quixote’s (the authorship of Don Quixote is the topic of 
discussion between Quinn and Auster). Finally, the ‘real’ author of The New York 
Trilogy, Paul Auster has a double that makes an appearance (also as a writer) in the 
novella. His triple is private eye Paul Auster (the identity that Quinn assumes). 
Furthermore, Quinn gets three phone calls from Stillman Jr., and he speaks to Stillman 
Sr. three times (each time appearing as a different character). Tripling, more than 
doubling evokes the experience of the labyrinth; as possibilities expand so, too, do 
uncertainties.  
The mirrors are finally shattered when Quinn comes face to face with Auster; 
this moment signals the beginning of the disintegration of Quinn’s identity. After Quinn 
explains the misunderstanding of the Stillman case and realizes Auster is unable to help 
him, Quinn and Auster become engaged in a literary analysis of the authorship of Don 
Quixote, “the book inside the book Cervantes wrote, the one he imagined writing” 
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(Auster 97). This discussion forces Quinn to the center of his labyrinth. Auster questions 
the authorship of Don Quixote and presents a theory arguing that the author of the novel 
is a combination of four different people: Sancho Panza (who dictated the story to Don 
Quixote’s friends), Don Quixote’s friends (who wrote the story in Spanish), Simon 
Carasco (who translated it to Arabic), and Cervantes (who found the manuscript and 
translated it back to Spanish) (Auster 99). According to Auster, this was done by Don 
Quixote’s friend to cure him of his madness; “The idea was to hold a mirror up to Don 
Quixote’s madness, to record each of his absurd and ludicrous delusions so that when he 
finally read the book himself, he would see the error of his ways” (Auster 99).  
One cannot help but question if City of Glass is meant to function in the same 
manner for Quinn. Perhaps it mocks his attempt to find certainty in a city so fragmented 
and wholeness in a language so incomplete. Certainty, like reflections in a mirror, is but 
an illusion. The only way out of this labyrinth is to go within. Just as Don Quixote is 
meant to function as a mirror to cure him of his madness (according to Auster’s theory), 
City of Glass is the mirror which reveals to Quinn the ludicrousness of his task as a 
writer-turned-detective. Upon this realization, the mirrors are shattered. Quinn, a writer 
of mystery novels by profession, initially believes that “[i]n the good mystery there is 
nothing wasted, no sentence, no word that is not significant. And even if it is not 
significant, it has the potential to be so—which amounts to the same thing” (Auster 8). 
Accordingly, Quinn believes in the meaningfulness of Stillman Sr.’s curious 
wanderings. Initially, the reader is led to believe that Quinn is responsible for his own 
choices. After all, he willingly assumes Auster’s identity and makes the decision to trail 
Stillman Sr. for many days. Prior to the case, Quinn roamed the city-labyrinth of New 
York and wandered where he pleased: “New York was an inexhaustible space, a 
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labyrinth of endless steps, and no matter how well he came to know its neighborhood 
and streets, it always left him with the feeling of being lost. Lost, not only in the city, but 
within himself as well” (Auster 3-4). He has never had to question his own curious 
wanderings in the city of New York, and perhaps only does so when he trails Stillman.  
Thus, once he faces Auster, he is forced into the center of his own labyrinth.  Auster 
asserts that Don Quixote was only pretending to be mad in order “to test the gullibility 
of his fellow men…to what extent would people tolerate blasphemies if they gave them 
amusement. The answer is obvious, isn’t it? To any extent…And that’s finally all 
anyone wants out of a book—to be amused” (Auster 100). Auster asserts that Don 
Quixote possibly devised the writing of his own narrative, for “throughout the book Don 
Quixote is preoccupied by the question of posterity. Again and again he wonders how 
accurately the chronicler will record his adventures” (Auster 99). The reader, once again, 
is left to wonder whether Quinn himself (who bears the same initials as Don Quixote) 
unknowingly takes part in a mystery novel created merely for the sake of amusement. 
Auster the author (not the character in the novel) is the creator of Daniel Quinn, and the 
Stillman case is nothing but a mere joke. Upon sharing his theory with Quinn, Auster 
“smiled with a certain ironic pleasure” and was “enjoying himself, but the precise nature 
of that pleasure obviously eluded Quinn. It seemed to be a kind of soundless laughter, a 
joke that stopped short of its punchline, a generalized mirth that had no object” (Auster 
100). As Quinn faces Auster, the reader discovers that Quinn is a helpless character in a 
detective novel written only for the sake of amusement. He is not the creator of his 
labyrinth, but a prisoner of a labyrinth created for him. He attempts to return to his 
former life only to discover that another tenant had occupied his apartment. As his 
identity evolves from Quinn to Auster, from writer to detective to writer once more, his 
57 
 
mirrors are shattered and his fragmented reflection appears on the broken shards. Similar 
to the journey through the labyrinth, Quinn’s journey is a hopeless search for meaning. 
With each choice, he believes he is close to an exit only to realize that it is merely 
another perplexing path.   
In Biritus, the mirroring is illustrated on a vertical axis, as the aboveground 
world and its underground counterpart appear to mirror one other. The parallel cities are 
both named ‘Beirut’; like the city above, the inhabitants below also refer to their city as 
Beirut, calling the city above ‘the outside world’ (Jābir 48). The underground city 
resembles a Beirut of the past, thus it is a spatial mirror to another temporal dimension 
that is very much reminiscent of a ghostly war-torn Beirut: 
The underground city reflects the multiple past lives of the place, wars and 
natural disasters that dragged people underground. Beirut, a synecdochic 
domicile standing for death, has always been associated with violence and 
destruction stretching back to pre-historical and Roman times. (Aghacy 166) 
Darkness fills the spaces below and the loudest noises come in mere murmurs and 
whispers. Even the inhabitants below physically resemble each other, with their wide 
eyes and pale, elongated faces further illustrating the effect of mirroring within the 
labyrinth. In his early days in the world below, Buṭrus is unable to tell one face from 
another. The memory of the death of Buṭrus’s father mirrors that of Raḥīl’s mother. Her 
own mother choked to death (Jābir 152) just as Buṭrus’s father also ‘choked’ as a result 
of his severe asthma attacks (Jābir 222). Similarly, the image of his mother who had died 
of cancer resembles the inhabitants below; in her final stages, she too had a pale, ghostly 
appearance and wide eyes (Jābir 221). The mirroring is also present in the manner in 
which his father’s image returns to Buṭrus in the world below. He sees his father’s 
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countenance in three figures: the astronomer Salmān (45), his caretaker Ishaac (47), and 
the hunter ‘Abās (136). Everything that happens below is not only a reflection of past 
world above but also an entrance to the ghostly vaporous world of untold stories that 
linger in the city.    
Furthermore, the labyrinth functions as a mirror to a labyrinth within. Buṭrus’s 
memories return to him as he walks the labyrinth below. Each memory from the world 
above finds a reflection in the subterranean world. Memories of ‘falling’ into the 
underground reappear from various stages of his life. Buṭrus recalls that as a child, he 
had once been stuck in a sewer tunnel; he had stared for hours at the rocks which took 
the shapes of animals and fantastical creatures (Jābir 27). This memory is not only 
actualized by his fall into Biritus but also by the otherworldly sights he sees there; he 
sees timeless human-like Roman statues in a valley known as the ‘Valley of Hell’ (94).  
When he walks through an impoverished neighborhood in underground Beirut, 
he is reminded of the refugee camp he once volunteered to help in as young man (Jābir 
194). His description of the refugee camp above is very much detailed that it appears to 
take precedence over the journey below. The physical journey itself is no longer 
important; rather, what takes precedence are the vivid memories which are reflections 
and mirrors to his past. As he tells Jābir of his descent, the memory of a former 
colleague, George Zakhour, who had fallen through an open manhole surfaces in his 
mind, resembling Buṭrus’s fall into the world below. The manhole was then closed by a 
passing walker and Zakhour remained inside for two days. Buṭrus comments that 
Zakhour was never the same after this incident, and this mirrors his state own state upon 
his escape from the labyrinth (Jābir 26). The legend of the ‘mud people’ mirrors the 
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militant fighters of a battered, war-torn Beirut. The inhabitants below live in fear of 
legends of the past as illustrated by their belief in the ‘mud people’. They believe that 
during the period of the plague, the inhabitants of one of the neighborhoods below 
devoured mud because they could not find anything else to eat; thus, a woman bore the 
first ‘mud baby’. Gradually, they grew in number and began attacking the inhabitants 
below until they were chased away from the city (Jābir 110). The dread of the ‘mud 
people’ living beyond the gates continues to haunt their present. Although Raḥīl herself 
is unable to conceive of large numbers, she claims that the ‘mud people’ certainly 
outnumber the population of the inhabitants below (Jābir 52). The ‘mud people’ mirror 
the militant fighters of the civil war in the city above. Buṭrus’s memories become 
infused with those of his brother’s, a militant fighter in the war. He tells Jābir of Nizār’s 
memories in the first-person, and he comes to claim the memories as his own. After a 
drinking rampage, Nizār and his companions slather their faces and bodies with mud and 
attack another militant faction, brutally killing the fighters (Jābir 214). Buṭrus’s 
description of the militant fighters mirrors the image of the mud people in the 
underground world. The mud-painted faces of Nizār and his companions are reminiscent 
of the ‘mud people’ who are feared by the inhabitants below.   
Thus, the journey through the underground labyrinth is a mirror to Buṭrus’s 
memories, and it exposes a labyrinth within. The mirroring suggests that the world 
inside the labyrinth is very much connected to the world above; “What appear to be two 
ontologically different worlds turn out to be interrelated where the upper city defines 
itself against the underground city, revealing porosity of boundaries between them” 
(Aghacy 164). Thus, the imagery of mud finds its place in the upper and lower cities. 
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The mud covered his brother’s face during the horrendous battles of the civil war 
mimicking the manner in which the ‘mud people’ come alive in the world below. 
Similarly, Buṭrus’s own father dies as a result of his asthma attacks; his final words echo 
the sensation of choking as he claims that the mud in his throat gradually prevents him 
from breathing.   
The labyrinths in Biritus and City of Glass have an order which is perceived as a 
disorder by the lost protagonists. In City of Glass, Quinn realizes the impossibility of 
deciphering the rules that govern the labyrinth of language. Unable to find meaning in 
the labyrinth of language, he resorts to finding meaning in the language within. He 
realizes the absurdity and impossibility of searching for linguistic permanence. 
Ultimately, his journey through the labyrinth leads to his own destruction. In the end, he 
realizes that the world is as fragmented as it was prior to his journey through the 
labyrinth. The journey itself merely forces him to face the fragmented city and language. 
Similarly, in Biritus, Buṭrus realizes that the stone labyrinth beneath the city of Beirut 
cannot be assimilated through the lens of the present. The city below is that of the past 
wherein the relations that have maintained the continuity of the city below are no longer 
present in the city above. He escapes the labyrinth, for he knows that in succumbing to 
its order, he is doomed.   
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Chapter Three 
Perceptions of Time in the Labyrinth 
 “Alice: How long is forever?  
White Rabbit: Sometimes, just one second.” 
–Alice in Wonderland 
 
Just as the space of the labyrinth imposes a certain order on the lost walker, it 
undoubtedly imposes a certain time pattern, one which can only be sustained inside the 
labyrinth. How, then, does the walker perceive time in the labyrinth? In order to address 
this question, one must attempt to understand the concept of time which has, over and 
over again, proven to be difficult to define. In The Nick of Time, Elizabeth Grosz 
describes time as “the most enigmatic, the most paradoxical, elusive, and ‘unreal’ of any 
form of material existence” (4). We certainly cannot deny the existence of time, yet we 
remain unable to prove its tangibility. St. Augustine asks, “What then is time?” and 
proposes the following answer: “If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain 
it to him who asks, I do not know” (qtd. in Congdon 97).   
In many ways, time is a public concept which links us through history. In his 
Being and Time, Martin Heidegger describes the notion of public time which Dasein
3
 
utilizes “with regards to what dates time, the moving sun” (379). Thus, the rising and 
setting sun becomes the most natural form of measuring time. Dasein divides his time 
based on the ‘clock’ of the natural world: 
This dating of things in terms of the heavenly body giving forth light and 
warmth, and in terms of its distinctive ‘places’ in the sky, is a way of giving time 
                                                          
3
 Dasein is a German word which translates to “presence” or “existence”. Heidegger uses this word when 
referring to a being, namely any human being.   
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which can be done  in our being-with-one-another ‘under the same sky,’ and 
which can be done for ‘everyone’ at any time in the same way so that within 
certain limits everyone is initially agreed upon it…At the same time everyone 
can ‘count on’ this public dating in which everyone gives himself his time. It 
makes use of a measure that is available to the public. (Heidegger 379-380)  
This measure which is available to the public is organized through the calendar. Paul 
Riceour states that the “time of the calendar is the first bridge constructed by historical 
practice between lived time and universal time” (105). Hence, the calendar becomes the 
instrument by which our cosmologolical understanding of time is linked to our 
temporality, our lived experience of time. 
However, our perceptions of time are also undoubtedly private; Bergson 
describes that we alone know what it is like to feel “our own person in its flowing 
through time…With no other thing can we sympathize intellectually, or…spiritually. 
But one thing is sure: we sympathize with ourselves” (191). Thus, no two individuals are 
able to perceive the passage of time in precisely the same manner. The distinction 
between the public understanding of time and our private perceptions of it is important 
when one considers the difference between chronology and temporality; “If temporality 
is, as it must be, human time-consciousness, chronology, as its contrary, appears to take 
on the role of something more objective or cosmological here: something that exists on 
the outside of language, of discourse and of the mind” (Currie 96). Temporality, which 
exists in the realm of language, is directly linked to our private perceptions of time 
which very often contradict sequential chronology.   
In his essay “Time in Literature”, J. Hillis Miller attempts to understand 
perceptions of time in literature arguing that all words which are used to designate time 
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are figurative and spatial (87). He states, “The most salient everyday example of the 
spatialization of time is the movement of the clock's hands through space” (87). 
Linguistic expressions of temporality (in the Western world) are principally spatial, thus 
“they transform time into space” (Hillis Miller 87). This is evident through expressions 
that suggest the movement of time; time can be perceived as moving too fast or too 
slowly. Likewise, when one states, “I’ll make time for extracurricular activities,” one is 
initially ‘producing’ time for a certain activity to be carried out in a place of a sort. 
However, one can also argue that we often use temporal units to describe spatial distance 
as when one states he will be arriving to a given destination in thirty minutes; this 
illustrates that distance (space) is also measured through our conceptions of time. Hence, 
the concepts of time and space are relative and function in relation to one another. As 
Aristotle describes:    
Not only do we measure the movement by time, but also the time by the 
movement, because they define each other…And we measure both the distance 
by the movement and the movement by the distance; for we say that the road is 
long, if the journey is long, and that this is long, if the road is long—the time, 
too, if the movement, and the movement, if the time. (qtd. in Congdon 60)   
Although time cannot be easily defined, it can be perceived and felt through its 
effects. The passage of time is very much associated with the notion of change. Because 
“no two moments are identical in a conscious being” (Bergson 193), one is able to 
experience the passage of time. Nietzsche in “History in the Service and Disservice of 
Life” contrasts the state of man’s ability to measure time with a grazing herd which is 
not aware of the passage of time: 
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Consider the herd grazing before you; aware of no yesterday, no today, it frolics 
about, feeds, sleeps, digests, and frolics again from morning till night and from 
day to day, tethered by its pleasures and aversions, pegged to the moment, and 
therefore neither sad nor satiated. (88)  
Thus, if time is a measure of change, then we are only able to perceive time because we 
can observe change. Unlike Nietzsche’s frolicking sheep, unaware of the past or the 
future, our notions of temporality are an integral part of our everyday life. Our lives are 
governed by the passage of each day and the steady ticking off the clock; we are often 
forced to conform to its rhythms. 
3.1 Time in the Labyrinth: Moving Forward by Moving Backward 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, labyrinths share common features with 
heterotopias; however, they also have distinct qualities which characterize them as such. 
While the function of heterotopias varies depending on the nature of the space, the key 
function of labyrinths is to ensure that the walker becomes lost in its paths. An important 
aspect of heterotopias and labyrinths follows from Foucault’s fourth principle of 
heterotopias:   
Heterotopias are most often linked to slices in time—which is to say that they 
open onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, heterochronies. The 
heterotopia begins to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of 
absolute break with their traditional time. (26) 
Thus, both heterotopias and labyrinths offer a unique temporal experience. Once inside 
the labyrinth, the walker is not only geographically and physically isolated from the 
world outside but also temporally detached. The walker becomes a prisoner of its space 
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and a captive of its time, for the labyrinth imposes on the lost walker a distinct temporal 
order. 
This temporal order is characterized by a backwards movement in time. Inside 
the labyrinth, the protagonists are able to move forward in the space only by moving 
backwards first. Like the historian who returns to the past to reconstruct earlier events, 
the detective also returns to the past in search of clues when resolving a case. “The 
detective and the historian share this structure of moving forwards by knowing the past” 
(Currie 88). As Buṭrus tells Jābir of his journey, he goes back in time. He retrieves the 
story of his journey and along with it, his own personal memories of a pre-war and war-
torn Beirut. Thus, he not only exposes his own past but that of the city, playing the role 
of a historian. Similarly, Quinn also must return backwards in time. When he gets the 
call from Stillman Jr. and assumes the identity of a detective, he goes back in time to 
resolve the case. Furthermore, the discovery that Quinn’s story is a mere reconstruction 
by an anonymous narrator also illustrates a backwards movement; the anonymous 
narrator himself becomes a detective as he tries to reconstruct Quinn’s past and resolve 
the case.  Currie contends that “the idea that moving forwards in time involves a 
backwards narration is more than just a novelistic structure, and might be thought of…as 
the shape of time itself” (88). For instance, the process of aging is the acquisition of 
memories after the “hereness and nowness of childhood” (88). Thus, memories play a 
significant role in relation to how one experiences time the experience of the passage of 
time. They allow us to keep track of what once was. Memories then belong to the 
temporal realm; “Why busy memory with reproducing the past and give it a place in 
space? Its place after all is in time” (Meyer 638). Hence, the role of memories is very 
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much relevant to our perceptions and conceptions of time, for memories become a form 
of measuring time; this measurement of time is not based on sequential chronology 
rather on temporality. An individual’s memory is his experience of time in its most 
private form.  
The role of memories in Buṭrus’s labyrinth is significant as the retrieval of 
memories permits him to leave the labyrinth. Contrary to Buṭrus, Quinn is unable to 
retrieve his memories thus cannot escape the labyrinth. The backwards movement 
implies a return to the past. Buṭrus, who is able to come to terms with his memories, 
though with great difficulty, manages to escape. Unfortunately for Quinn, he remains 
unable to return to his memories thus remains stuck in the paths of the labyrinth. As a 
result of this backwards movement, the journey through the labyrinth becomes an 
internal one, and the characters leave the labyrinth as changed individuals. Thus, the 
journey through the labyrinth is as much as about the innumerable futures that result 
from the choices one makes within as it is about memories of the past. Paradoxically, by 
going to the past, they temporarily live outside history and time.    
3.2 Perceptions of Temporality in Biritus madīna taḥta al-arḍ 
The geography of the city below imposes on its inhabitants a certain temporal 
order. Because the city of Biritus is an underground city, the rising sun is no longer 
present to indicate the passage of yet another day. The inhabitants of Biritus do not 
follow the ‘natural’ temporal rhythms as they do not have the passage of night and day. 
They live in darkness, and their primary source of light comes from that of the candle. 
They use alternative methods to measure time. For instance, Buṭrus learns to tell time by 
watching the candles melt (Jābir 60). He knows when his host will be arriving by 
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determining how much of the candle has melted. Likewise, when he is well enough to 
walk through the labyrinth, he measures distance using the candle, telling Jābir that it 
took over three candles to get to a certain neighborhood (Jābir 155). The candles replace 
the clock in the world below. Similarly, the inhabitants below also measure the passage 
of time through observing seasonal changes. When Buṭrus regains consciousness after 
his fall into the underground city, his caretaker Isḥāq explains that Buṭrus had been 
unconscious since the rainy season. Buṭrus finally regains consciousness during the dry 
season indicating that he has likely been unconscious for months (Jābir 47). Buṭrus 
recalls seeing a clock on Isḥāq’s wall only to discover that it is merely placed there for 
decorative purposes, as it has ceased to function long ago; the world below is “an oneiric 
place, an amalgamation of necropolis and pastoral, an antiquated and clandestine version 
of the upper city.” (Aghacy165). Time, as Buṭrus knows it, is suspended. His new 
temporal experience takes him back in time. Through telling Jābir of his physical 
journey below, he recalls his own memories. As such, the memories themselves come to 
take precedence over the underground journey in the labyrinth. This is illustrated 
through the manner by which he describes his memories when compared to his 
description of the underground city. As Buṭrus tells Jābir of the world below, his 
description is unnecessarily detailed and devoid of emotion. However, when he 
describes his personal memories of his childhood, his father, and the war description 
becomes vivid and alive. His memories appear more lively and vivid than his 
experiences in the dreary world below. Hence, the memories take precedence over the 
physical journey of treading the labyrinth. His journey is transformed into an internal 
one where he can only move forward by moving backwards and retrieving his own 
memories from the past. Only through remembering can Buṭrus move forward. 
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The journey through the physical labyrinth reflects the manner in which Buṭrus’s 
memories return to him, for they do not surface chronologically but spatially. With every 
step Buṭrus takes in the labyrinth, he is reminded of yet another memory. The memories 
return to Buṭrus passing through a twisting and fragmented path of their own. Buṭrus’s 
spatial journey below brings to the surface memories of the world above, for “the past 
comes alive in wavering images and fragmented modes” (Aghacy170). These 
fragmented memories cling to spaces as much as they do to individuals. Perhaps some 
memories are best forgotten; they ought to remain in a labyrinth of their own. Like a trap 
door to another time-space, these memories lock us in mazes of the past. Memory 
becomes a bulk to be carried around; in his labyrinth, Buṭrus tries to resist “the great and 
ever-growing burden of the past, which weighs him down and distorts him, obstructing 
his movement like a dark, invisible load…” (Nietzsche 89). His journey takes him back 
in time in order to allow him to confront his own memories. He is finally able to escape 
the labyrinth when he confronts his most terrifying memory. In what is known as the 
‘Neighborhood of the Blind’, Buṭrus sees the face of Ibrahim, a cousin who had been 
kidnapped and never found during the civil war (Jābir 230). Through confronting this 
memory, Buṭrus realizes that he must choose the present, refusing to carry the bulk of 
the past. Treading the labyrinth allows Buṭrus into the memories of the past; “His 
underground journey teaches him not to erase but rather to cope with the past” (Aghacy 
172). Hence, his encounter with his past memories permits Buṭrus find his way out of 
the labyrinth.  
Biritus also connects a present-day reconstructed Beirut with its many pasts; the 
retrieval of Buṭrus’s personal memories brings to the surface memories of the city itself, 
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taking Buṭrus further backwards in time. The existence of the underground city reminds 
us of the history that exists beneath us. The aboveground Beirut exists above layers of 
history that are not a noticeable part of the space. The underground city is a labyrinth 
where the upper city’s ‘waste’ is eliminated as a means of self-preservation. Decades 
after the war, the aboveground city is unable to hold on to the memories of the war; they 
have been replaced by new geographical topographical markers. The astronomer Salmān 
uses topographical markers of a pre-war Beirut to navigate the labyrinth below; Buṭrus 
himself is unable to identify these landmarks as they disappeared after the war ended. 
For instance, Salmān tells Buṭrus that they are located beneath “Souks of the 
Blacksmiths”. Buṭrus explains that he only has a vague recollection of these souks which 
had been destroyed during the war (Jābir 89). While he attempts to situate himself in 
relation to the present aboveground Beirut, the labyrinth forces him to use markers of the 
past to map his geographical dimensions. He has no memory of this past Beirut or of the 
many layers of history beneath it, thus he cannot determine how he relates to the space 
of the labyrinth below. “Individuals without access to memory are unable to accurately 
situate themselves in their environments” (Hayek 134); only when he recalls his 
memories is he able to escape the labyrinth.    
As he is temporarily eliminated from the upper Beirut, Buṭrus becomes wedged 
in a labyrinth of memory where the spatial journey through the labyrinth brings to the 
surface fragments of his traumatic past as well as a city’s past which goes back prior to 
the civil war itself. Thus, his journey which goes beyond the war itself reminds us of the 
layers of history existing beneath us. As Samira Aghacy explains in Writing Beirut, “The 
narrator’s story can be construed as a bird’s eye-view of Lebanon’s tragic history: the 
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victims of the 1860 massacres from Damascus, Hasbayya, Dar al-Qamar, Zahla and 
Jizzin; the victims of the famine” (166). The inhabitants below have become a part of 
history, one that remains invisible and unknown. The historian Mas’ūd tells Buṭrus of 
the surge of dark-skinned people who fell into the city with burnt bodies and ripped 
clothes; Buṭrus concludes that Mas’ūd is likely referring to the Mount Lebanon Civil 
War in 1860 (Jābir 106). Moreover, Buṭrus is taken to visit an area known as the Valley 
of Hell, he is fascinated at the sight of human-like statues; when he asks how these 
statues had been created, he is told that they had been created by time (Jābir 194).  
Buṭrus concludes that they must have survived from Roman times. Jābir’s imagined 
labyrinth reminds us of the concrete layers of history existing meters beneath; it also 
reminds us that, one day, we will be amongst these layers.  
Furthermore, through exposing the past of the city-labyrinth below, Buṭrus 
comes to play the role of the historian. The narrator oscillates between story-teller and 
historian; initially, he tells Jābir that his intention is to tell their (those in the 
underground city) story and not his own (Jābir 16); however, in telling their story, he 
also reveals his own personal past. From the very beginning, Buṭrus does not present 
himself as a historian but merely as a story-teller telling the story of those below. 
Paradoxically, in the world below, he comes to be known as the historian’s son who is 
acquiring the stories of the past from the historian. Thus, in many ways, he ends up 
writing history, a task which he did not embark on. The parallels between the names 
Buṭrus and Biritus suggest that the city is itself also telling its story through the 
mouthpiece of Buṭrus. The boundaries between fiction and history are further blurred by 
the fact that Yasmīna tells Buṭrus that the only person to be trusted is the astronomer 
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Salmān. The historian Mas’ūd, who has within him many tales and secrets of the past, 
cannot even be trusted. This causes us to question to what extent history itself can be 
trusted.  His knowledge can never be whole, thus cannot be entirely reliable. As 
illustrated by Jābir, the underground city of Beirut comprises layer over layer of history 
that dates back to thousands of years. Many hidden and undiscovered pasts survive time 
without ever being a part of it.  
Memories play an important role, for they are often “assumed to be the making 
of history” (Middleton and Woods 5). As such, they link us through time. Boutrous 
returns to a history that goes back beyond the war itself, to centuries ago. This reminds 
us of the forgotten and unseen layers of history existing beneath us. It also reminds us 
that we can never truly assimilate the past through the lens of the present. Buṭrus’s 
inability to navigate the labyrinth is greatly a result of his inability to assimilate the past. 
Furthermore, in his construction of an underground city, Jābir illustrates that the past is a 
dynamic force. The more we delve into it, the more we discover its changing, volatile 
nature.  
3.3 Perceptions of Temporality in City of Glass 
In City of Glass, Quinn enters a labyrinth of his creation when he decides to 
become the detective in the Stillman case. Once inside the labyrinth, he is entirely 
detached from his former conception of time. This is illustrated after Quinn’s first 
encounter with Stillman Jr. Quinn felt as though he had spent four hours at Stillman’s 
house, when in fact he had spent the entire day (Auster 36). After his visit, he tells 
himself, “I must learn to look at my watch more often” (Auster 36); this indicates the 
initial changes in his temporal experience.  
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Likewise, Stillman Jr. and Stillman Sr. live in isolated labyrinths of their own, 
thus they experience a distinct conception of time. As Stillman Jr. tells Quinn of his past, 
his detachment from perceptions of time outside the labyrinth is evident through his 
statement: “But I know nothing of time. I am new every day. I am born when I wake up 
in the morning, I grow old during the day, and I die at night when I go to sleep” (Asuter 
18). Similarly, Stillman Sr.’s ahistorical conception of time is revealed when he tells 
Quinn, “And not to have been born is a curse. And when you live outside time, there is 
no day and night, You don’t even get a chance to die” (Auster 85). As Quinn is slowly 
erased from time, he too discovers that he does not get a chance to die; his fate remains 
forever uncertain. 
In the final stages of his journey through the labyrinth, Quinn follows in their 
paths, as he also lives “outside time.” As Quinn’s identity slowly dissolves, the manner 
by which he perceives and utilizes time changes. Prior to taking the case, he had time to 
do as he pleased. He becomes a prisoner of a labyrinth born out of his decision to take 
the Stillman case. Consequently, the labyrinth imposes its own time on the walker, and 
Quinn cannot but succumb to its temporal order. When the unresolved Stillman case 
comes to an end, Quinn’s attempt to return to his former life (and time) is futile. After 
his discussion with Auster, Quinn returns to search for Stillman Jr. For months, he waits 
for Stillman in a nearby alleyway, but Stillman never appears. Finding refuge in a 
garbage can in an alleyway next to Stillman Jr.’s apartment, he gradually adapts to the 
new temporal order of his labyrinth. Because he is required to remain cautious and alert 
at all times, he adopts a distinct time pattern. He decides to sacrifice his sleep and 
instead of sleeping for his usual six to eight hours, he decides to limit himself to three to 
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four. He realizes that, hypothetically, “the most efficient use of the time would be to 
sleep for thirty seconds every five or six minutes” (Auster 116). Realizing the 
impossibility of this task, he decides to sleep for fifteen-minute intervals. The fifteen-
minute intervals of ringing bells of a nearby church help him achieve this: 
Quinn lived by the rhythm of that clock, and eventually he had trouble 
distinguishing it from his own pulse. Starting at midnight, he would begin his 
routine, closing his eyes and falling asleep before the clock had struck twelve. 
Fifteen minutes later he would wake, at the half-hour double stroke fall asleep, 
and at the three-quarter-hour triple stroke wake once more. At three-thirty he 
would go off for his food, return by four o’clock, and then go to sleep again. 
(Auster 116) 
His journey through the labyrinth forces him into a new temporal order where time is not 
measured by the passage of days or the ticking off the clock but by the ringing bells of a 
nearby church. After weeks of living in the alleyway, Quinn finally attempts to return to 
his former life; he returns to his apartment only to discover that it has been occupied by 
another tenant. When he tells her that he is a writer who had formerly lived in the 
apartment, she mockingly responds, “A writer? That’s the funniest thing I ever heard” 
(Auster 126). Quinn is gradually physically erased and like Stillman Jr. and Stillman Sr., 
he disintegrates until he is no more a part of time.  
His disintegration is complete when he returns once more to Stillman Jr.’s 
deserted house and falls asleep on the floor. There, he entirely loses his ability to keep 
track of time, as “night and day were no more than relative terms; they did not refer to 
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an absolute condition” (Auster 128). He no longer has recognition of the passage of 
time: 
He could never be sure how much time passed during each interval, for he did 
not concern himself with counting the days or the hours. It seemed to him, 
however, that little by little the darkness had begun to win out over the light, that 
whereas in the beginning there had been a predominance of sunshine, the light 
had gradually become fainter and more fleeting. (Auster 130) 
The backwards movement in time is illustrated through Quinn’s attempt to 
resolve the Stillman case. Quinn is summoned to prevent a crime from happening: 
Stillman Sr. who is to be released from prison is a potential threat to his son. Quinn is 
forced to go backwards in time in order to move forward in this labyrinth. He meets 
Stillman Jr. who narrates the story of his childhood, taking Quinn backwards in time. 
Furthermore, Quinn goes back in time in search of Stillman Sr.’s past hoping he can find 
clues that will reveal Stillman’s intentions upon being released from prison. He reads 
Stilllman Sr.’s book about religion and the prelapsarian language which takes Quinn to a 
past that goes beyond time and language. Unlike the underground labyrinth of Berytus 
which holds layers of history and extends back in time to thousands of years, the city of 
New York goes back a mere four-hundred years in history. Auster (through the character 
Stillman Sr.) gives the city a deeper connection with history through biblical and 
historical references. In his book, Stillman Sr. argues that the first explorers to visit the 
new world believed that they had discovered “a second Garden of Eden” (Auster 41). 
Stillman’s argument centers on the discovery of the new world and its association with 
the discovery of a second Garden of Eden. He claims that “the discovery of the new 
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world was the quickening impulse of utopian thought, the spark that gave hope to the 
perfectibility of human life” (Auster 42). According to Henry Dark, the character 
invented by Stillman, achieving this perfectibility involves a return to the original 
language of God where “a thing and its name were interchangeable” (Auster 43) as had 
been the case prior to the fall. Thus, Stillman (through his alter ego, Henry Dark) argues 
that, “Names became detached from things; words devolved into a collection of arbitrary 
signs; language had been severed from God. The story of the Garden, therefore, not only 
records the fall of man, but the fall of language” (Auster 43). Stillman Sr. associates the 
city of New York with the city of Babel. The old city of Babel becomes a part of the 
history of New York; the analogy is also significant through the tower of Babel which 
mimics the towering skyscrapers of New York. Although the fate of the Tower of Babel 
was inevitable, Stillman Sr. believes that the city of New York can, perhaps, avoid this 
fate through preventing the ‘collapse’ of language which had occurred earlier; the 
collapse of language was a punishment by God inflicted on the people of Earth for 
attempting to build the Tower of Babel. Stillman Sr. ventures back in time to a period 
where language was ‘whole’. His (failed) attempt to control language is, in fact, an 
attempt to control time. Through this process, however, he learns that time “throws 
language off balance, forcing it to branch and vary” (Meyer 638), thus language remains 
incapable of being ‘complete’. Our language “is completely linked to, indeed formed by, 
history, hence always belated and insufficient, but nevertheless a functional and 
necessary convention” (Söderlind 11). Regardless of the notion that what we say will 
never entirely correspond to what we mean, language remains the only form through 
which to express our temporality. Our incomplete language, like our deficient 
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knowledge of history, will only ever yield a partial understanding of our words and our 
world.  
What remains of Quinn’s identity are his words which linger in his red notebook. 
Quinn returns to a place with no time and no memories when he finds shelter in Stillman 
Jr.’s deserted apartment. Like Buṭrus’s journey, Quinn’s own journey through the 
labyrinth becomes an internal one. Through his backwards movement in time, Quinn 
returns to a primordial time-space where he “remembered the moment of his birth and 
how he had been pulled gently from his mother’s womb” (Auster 131). Thus, this rebirth 
takes Quinn into the unknown, as the reader is never certain of his fate. Like Stillman Sr. 
and Stillman Jr. who are never heard of again, Quinn dissolves into an unknown time-
space. His journey through the labyrinth only takes him to a period prior to time itself. 
Quinn’s perception of time very much reflects the manner by which he comes to utilize 
language. He is only allowed to exist in atemporally; similarly his language also cannot 
but exist as part of an atemporal time-space. Thus, only in the space of his labyrinth, can 
Quinn’s language and time survive. 
His detachment from his memories prevents him from leaving his labyrinth. 
Even prior to taking the case, Quinn’s connection with his memories had been severed. 
Five years after the tragic death of his wife and son, he had learnt to detach himself from 
his past:  
He did not think about his son very much anymore, and only recently he had 
removed the photograph of his wife from the wall. Every once in a while, he 
would suddenly feel what it had been like to hold the three-year-old boy in his 
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arms—but that was not exactly thinking, nor was it even remembering. (Auster 
5)  
After the Stillman case, Quinn remains unable to return to his former life; “He tried to 
think about the life he had lived before the story began. This caused him many 
difficulties, for it seemed so remote to him now” (Auster 128). Unable to retrieve his 
memories or find his way back to his familiar pre-labyrinth language, a language that 
however incomplete continues to link us through time, Quinn’s identity dissolves; he 
remains lost in the paths of his labyrinth.    
3.4 Biritus madīna taḥta al-arḍ and City of Glass: Reinstated Back in 
Time  
Because the labyrinth becomes a structure that represents and houses marginal 
and invisible individuals and collectives in society, the stories within this space remain, 
for the most part, hidden and untold; they escape history, for they are not allowed to 
unfurl in the world outside the labyrinth. Perhaps the only way to be reinstated within 
history is through the recording of the walker’s journey, for “an event is recorded not 
because it happens, but it happens because it is recorded” (Currie 11).Only when stories 
are told are they reinserted in time. They become a trace of the ‘what once was’. The 
traces of the past linger to remind us that the past is always there, present in one form or 
another. Ricoeur adds that the trace can be understood as a “passage” (120). He 
explains:  
Someone passed by here. The trace invites us to pursue it, to follow it back, if 
possible, to the person or animal who passed this way. We may lose the trail. It 
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may even disappear or lead nowhere. The trace can be wiped out, for it is fragile 
and needs to be preserved intact; otherwise, the passage did occur but it did not 
leave a trace, it simply happened. We may know by other means that people or 
animals existed somewhere, but they will remain forever unknown if there is not 
some trace that leads to them. Hence the trace indicates ‘here’ (in space) and 
‘now (in present), the past passage of living beings. (120) 
Traces, when uncovered, are reinserted in time and history. Because the protagonists’ 
stories in Biritus and City of Glass are recorded and retold by external narrators, they are 
permitted to be a part of time once more. In Biritus, the character Jābir (who is also the 
author of the novel itself) records Buṭrus’s journey through the labyrinth in underground 
Beirut. Similarly, in City of Glass, Quinn’s story is retold by an anonymous narrator, a 
friend of Auster’s (the character in the novella). The mysterious narrator admits that he 
is able to piece Quinn’s story together when he finds his red notebook (the only trace 
Quinn leaves behind) in Stillman Jr.’s empty apartment. When the protagonists’ stories 
are transformed into written narratives, they function as traces. As such, we (the readers) 
are involved once again in a process of interpretation. We become detectives and 
historians, moving back and forth in time inside labyrinths of our own as we read the 
words to find meaning in order to escape. It is in the space of language that the 
‘wordless’ and the ‘worldless’ are given a voice and a space; they temporalize because 
their stories are told.  
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Conclusion 
Inside the labyrinth, one continuously attempts to make connections in order to 
find an exit. Perhaps this thesis was about finding connections between two protagonists 
and two fictitious worlds. The overlapping names of Buṭrus4 in Biritus and the two 
Peters in City of Glass are likely merely a coincidence. The allusions to Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland in the two novels establish yet another connection. Buṭrus’s 
fall into the underground city resembles Alice’s fall down the rabbit hole. Similarly, 
Stillman Sr. makes a reference to Humpty Dumpty from Lewis Carroll’s Through the 
Looking Glass; Stillman quotes, “The question is, said Alice, whether you can make 
words mean so many different things. The question is, said Humpty Dumpty, which is to 
be the master—that’s all” (Auster 81). The element of metafiction also connects the two 
novels. Quinn comments upon his role as an author of mystery novels: 
The detective is the one who looks, who listens, who moves through this morass 
of objects and events in search of the thought, the idea that will pull all these 
things together and make sense of them. In effect, the writer and the detective are 
interchangeable. (Auster 8) 
Buṭrus reflects on his own story as he tells his tale to Jābir. He remarks that although his 
story is tragic and painful, he has no choice but to tell it (Jābir 23). Similarly, in the end 
of the novel, Buṭrus tells Jābir that he hopes his story, once written by Jābir, will 
manifest itself as a fictional piece. When his story appears as a fictional narrative, it will 
seem less real and will no longer continue to haunt him (Jābir 229). Like the lost walker, 
the reader also treads a labyrinth of words and meanings as he tries to build connections. 
                                                          
4
 The name Buṭrus translates to Peter in English. 
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“What interested him [Quinn] about the stories he wrote was not their relation to the 
world but their relation to other stories” (Auster 7). Finding connections is, after all, the 
reader’s responsibility. Whether these connections are there or not does not matter; what 
matters is the possibility that they are.  
In City of Glass, the labyrinth is born out of the construction of a unique 
language that is understood only by those who invented it. Stillman Sr. and Stillman Jr. 
construct a new language that remains incomprehensible to Quinn; similarly, once inside 
his own labyrinth, Quinn also produces a language that remains incomprehensible to the 
reader. Thus, the labyrinth manifests itself through the construction of a language that 
cannot be ‘navigated’. It remains meaningless until we try to find connections in order to 
interpret the words and find our way out of this labyrinth with no walls. The labyrinth 
manifests itself as a hidden mazy underground city in Biritus. The order of the city-
labyrinth is perceived as a disorder by the lost protagonist.  Buṭrus realizes that he 
cannot grasp the order of the city-labyrinth below, for it clashes with the order of the 
aboveground city. Furthermore, as Buṭrus treads the path of this city-labyrinth, he is 
taken backwards in time to confront his own memories; thus, the physical labyrinth is 
only a tangible representation of a labyrinth within Buṭrus. His journey through the 
physical labyrinth brings to the surface memories of his past; these memories become 
active constituents of the space. He escapes when he finally confronts his most painful 
memory through his encounter with his cousin Ibrahim who was kidnapped and never 
found during the Lebanese Civil War.  
The map, with its structured paths, mocks the labyrinth. The labyrinth cannot be 
mapped; the walkers bring it to life with their movement and their choices. From above, 
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the exits are detectable. From within, the walker must try to construct his own map. 
Drawing the map can give some sense of cogency, for without control of our space, we 
will continue to be disorientated and lost. Buṭrus attempts to do this as tries to map the 
world below using markers of the world above; Quinn attempts to do this as he tries to 
draw a map of Stillman Sr.’s curious wanderings.      
The labyrinth not only imposes on the lost walker its spatial order but also its 
temporal one. This temporal order is characterized by a backwards movement in time, 
transforming the journey into an internal one. Only those who are able to confront their 
internal Minotaurs are able to escape the labyrinth.   
The spaces and entities which exist on the margins are the unnoticed labyrinths 
in today’s world. Spaces such as slums, ghettos, refugee camps, prisons, and subway 
stations are in themselves hidden labyrinths. Some walkers of these spaces become like 
Quinn; they eternally disappear. Others become like Buṭrus as they are forced to 
encounter forever changing experiences. Many continue to live in labyrinths that exist 
within. The journey through the labyrinth goes beyond the physical walls and does not 
end when the lost walker finds an exit. Rather it is a continuous internal journey, for it 
reflects any individual’s passage through life. The labyrinth resembles our condition: our 
loss and our fragmentation. More importantly, it illustrates our search for meaning; if 
and when we do find it, it leaves us changed. After all, the significance of the labyrinth 
is the journey itself.  
It seems fitting to end this thesis by referring once more to Borges’s Labyrinths. 
In his parable entitled “Borges and I,” Borges illustrates our internal labyrinth, namely 
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the struggle between the selves that exist within. The narrator, Borges, distinguishes 
between himself and another Borges, “the one things happen to” (246). The narrator 
knows this “other” Borges from the outside only; “I know of Borges from the mail and 
see his name on a list of professors or in a biographical dictionary” (246). This 
distinction between the narrator and the “other” Borges reminds us of the many 
Minotaurs that exist within. In the end, the narrator states that he does not know which 
Borges has written the words on the page (247). Yet, in the labyrinth, it does not matter 
who has written the page. What matters is that the page has been written, the journey 
told.  
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